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Abstract 
 The effect of currency union formation on trade growth may depend on an 
economy’s level of financial development.  Economies with lower levels of financial 
development have less capacity to hedge exchange rate risk, are susceptible to 
hysteresis, and have little to overcome the large fixed costs of entering foreign markets.  
These barriers may be partially overcome through the use of common currencies.  
Economies with high levels of financial development may already be capable of 
overcoming these barriers to trade and will likely not gain significant trade from 
common currency formation.  This paper tests the hypothesis that the currency union 
effect on trade varies across levels of financial development using gravity model data 
from Glick and Rose (2001) and over 219,000 observations of financial development 
between 1960 and 1997.  The findings of this research support the paper’s hypothesis 
and motivate important policy considerations for nations contemplating common 
currency formation. 
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Introduction 
Currency union formation remains a contentious policy decision for nations 
looking to grow international trade.  In 2013, Latvia entered the Eurozone as the first 
of many E.U. members planning to join within the next few years.  Meanwhile, the 
African nations of Tanzania, Burundi, Kenya, and Rwanda finalized plans to create a 
currency union within the decade.  Nonetheless, skeptics of currency integration 
continue to challenge the policy across Europe, Africa, and the world.  A 2013 poll 
showed that 50 percent of Latvians opposed joining the Eurozone (“RT,” 2014), and 
IMF director Christine Lagard warned East African policymakers that rushing toward 
common currency formation could upset the recent trend of economic growth in the 
region (Omondi, 2014).  These instances of common currency controversy necessitate 
a renewed effort to understand the currency union effect on trade. 
 Currency unions have the capacity to end unstable monetary policy, encourage 
economic integration, and facilitate international trade growth.  Most research holds 
that the overall growth in trade from currency union formation outweighs the negative 
effects of forfeited monetary sovereignty and loss of seigniorage inherent to currency 
integration.  To date, the trade growth caused by currency union formation is estimated 
to be anywhere from marginal  (Tenreyro 2001) to over 300 percent growth in trade 
(Rose 2000).  Such a wide disparity between these estimates of the currency union 
effect on trade motivates this paper’s research question. 
This paper attempts to strengthen the understanding of the currency union effect 
by testing whether the currency union effect on trade varies across levels of financial 
development.  A number of observations motivate this hypothesis.  First, significantly 
more countries with low levels of financial development fix their exchange rates and 
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join currency unions (Shu and Ye, 2011: 641).  This observation may reflect a 
perception that countries with low levels of financial development stand to gain more 
from currency union formation.  Additionally, theory suggests that firms tend to trade 
more in the international market when given access to high levels of financial 
development as higher access to credit allows for international expansion by providing 
a means for firms to hedge exchange rate risks, eliminate hysteresis, and overcome the 
large fixed costs of foreign market entry.  This theory gives rise to two questions.  First, 
can an economy experience the benefits of a highly developed financial system by 
joining a currency union? Second, previous research shows that currency unions have 
the ability to lower all the aforementioned barriers to trade; consequently, will the 
currency union effect on trade be stronger for economies with low levels of financial 
development? 
 This paper finds that the currency union effect on trade is stronger for economies 
with low levels of financial development and weaker for economies with higher levels 
of financial development.  This suggests that nations with lower levels of financial 
development stand to gain more trade from currency union formation as opposed to 
their more financially developed counterparts.  The paper begins by providing a 
literature review of theoretical and empirical studies relevant to the research question.  
The literature review first addresses studies on the currency union effect on trade before 
turning to the relevant theory and empirics from the financial development-trade nexus.  
From there, the paper works through the methodology used to answer the research 
question and describes the data used for testing the hypothesis.  The paper ends with a 
brief conclusion and several policy recommendations. 
  
3 
 
Literature Review 
The Rose Effect 
 In “One Money, One Market:  The Effect of Common Currencies on Trade,” 
Andrew Rose examines the effect of a currency union on trade and finds a large, 
positive effect.  Specifically, Rose showed through cross-sectional analysis that 
countries with common currencies trade up to three times more with one another than 
countries without a common currency.  Rose’s paper was monumental in the study of 
international trade; Jeffrey Frankel regarded the work as “the most influential 
economics paper of the past ten years” (Frankel, 2006: 1).  Rose himself noted that his 
findings seemed unbelievably large, and academics in the field immediately called 
Rose’s findings into question (Rose, 2000: 24).  To date, over 2,161 papers have cited 
the research.1 
 Rose tested the effect of common currencies on trade by creating an expansive 
dataset covering 33,903 bilateral trade observations during five different years (1970, 
1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990).  This data included all 186 countries and dependencies in 
existence at the time.  Using the dataset, Rose found 330 country pair combinations 
both actively involved in trade and sharing a common currency. 
 Rose used the gravity model to isolate the common currency effect.   The 
Gravity Model states that trade is largely dependent on the relative size, distance, and 
income of two countries.  Rose’s model is as follows:  
ln (RVod) = β1ln(RYoRYd) + β2ln(Distanceod) + β3(CUod) + controls 
                                                          
1 According to Google Scholar 
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where RV is the real value of bilateral trade, the RY’s are real GDPs of the origin nation 
(o) and the destination nation (d), and CU is a dummy variable equal to one  when 
nations o and d share a common currency (Baldwin, 2006).  Controls represents the 
additional explanatory variables used in Rose (2000) including exchange rate volatility, 
output, output per capita, distance, contiguity, language, free trade areas, dependencies, 
shared colonizers, colonial relationship, and number of observations.  Using this model, 
Rose found a 300 percent increase in trade for countries sharing the same currency.  
Rose’s findings still hold up given these additional inputs. 
 Previous literature on currency unions tends to identify common currency as an 
extreme case of exchange rate stability.  Rose (2000) was a significant contribution to 
the literature because it argued that the trade effect of common currency formation were 
exponentially greater than those of stable exchange rates.  Rose (2000) argued that the 
common currency itself encouraged trade in ways that stable exchange rates and even 
fixed exchange rates could not. 
Pruning the Rose Effect 
 Rose’s seemingly overblown estimate of the common currency union effect on 
trade led to an academic hunt to ground his astronomic findings.  Three criticisms of 
Rose’s work emerge in subsequent studies: (1) endogeneity, (2) inadequacy of Rose’s 
model, and (3) the omission of explanatory variables (Baldwin, 2006). 
Endogenous Common Currency 
 Since Andrew Rose published his findings, one of the main criticisms is the 
possibility that the trade growth associated with common currency formation is more 
related to the effects of the extensive economic integration inherent to common 
5 
 
currency implementation.  This criticism argues that the creation of common currency 
areas is not a random process, but a deliberate policy that comes with radical monetary 
reforms and increased political and economic integration between two trading 
partners—all of which could generate international trade growth.  Some argue that this 
endogeneity nullifies the Rose effect as it is impossible to separate the growth in trade 
caused by the aforementioned reforms and the trade growth resulting from the common 
currency effect. 
 Praussello (2012) also argues that there is no feasible way to separate the 
increased trade that is associated with the economic integration which  comes with 
currency union creation from the increased trade associated with the common currency 
itself (Praussello, 2012).  Persson (2001) makes a similar argument when describing 
the difficulty of manipulating the currency union effect.  Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc argue 
that it is too difficult to isolate the currency union effect after attempting to explain 
trade patterns in “demised” federations of Eastern Europe (2003). 
 Mongelli, Dorrucci, and Agur (2005) holds to the assumption that common 
currency areas are nonrandom, but the authors try to identify motivations behind the 
creation of common currency areas in order to better isolate the effect of common 
currency formation on trade.  Mongelli, Dorruci, and Agur (2005) runs causality tests 
and finds evidence that the growth of trade within the European Union is more linked 
to the institutional reforms than the common currency effect (2005). 
Nitsch and Berger (2008) as well as Tenreyro (2007) attempt to account for the 
possibility of endogeneity in their studies of the currency union effect and find a 
marginal effect on trade at most.  Nitsch and Berger (2008), which looked at the effect 
of the Eurozone, accounted for endogeneity by including an estimation of the increase 
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in trade growth caused by political and economic integration.  The authors found that 
this canceled out the currency union effect.  Tenreyro (2007) includes a measure for the 
probability of a country entering a currency union.  The author believes that this 
measure should account for endogeneity and finds that the variable greatly reduces the 
currency union effect. 
The most recent criticism of the Rose effect comes from Campbell (2013).  In 
his paper, Campbell points out the significant lack of attention paid to historical factors 
in Rose’s research.  Campbell goes through a large number of the observations in the 
Rose dataset and points out that many of the observed nations were undergoing 
significant crises during the time of common currency adoption.  Campbell also points 
out the significance of the missing data in Rose’s research and many subsequent studies 
arguing that by accounting for these historical events, endogeneity is eliminated and 
the currency union effect nullified. 
While many researchers, including some of the previously mentioned authors, 
believe that the currency union effect on trade is canceled out by accounting for other 
economic integration efforts taking place on the periphery, most researchers have 
accounted for the endogenous factors of common currency areas and still found a 
strong, positive currency union effect on trade. 
Tenreyro (2001) was among the first to account for the strong possibility that 
joining a currency union relied on endogenous selection and still observe a strong, 
positive currency union effect.  She argues, however, that the endogeneity can be 
isolated by including a self-selectivity variable.  With this variable, Tenreyro finds that 
by including a variable for endogenous selection, the effect of common currency on 
trade generally falls to 100 percent when looking at the Eurozone.  Frankel (2008) also 
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uses Eurozone data and finds that the currency union effect remains positive when 
accounting for endogeneity.  This finding is significant as it shows that the currency 
union effect can still be positive and significant when accounting for endogeneity.  
Nonetheless, endogeneity must be taken seriously in interpreting the results of any 
study in the field. 
Problems with the Model 
Other criticisms of the Rose effect go beyond the lack of variables in the model 
and raise issue with the model itself.  One relevant issue with Rose’s dataset is that the 
timeline only covers from 1970 to 1990.  This data is mostly made up of developing 
economies leaving currency unions, which may bias the results.  In an attempt to 
account for this issue, Micco, Stein, and Ordonez create their own dataset comprising 
of 22 industrialized country observations over the second half of the 20th Century 
(2003).  Similarly, most research updates the dataset to the time of publication.   
A major shift in methodology in the more recent literature appears in the change 
from the use of cross-sectional and time-series analysis to panel data analysis.  Previous 
efforts to study the common currency area effect implement a country-dummy variable 
in an attempt to account for change over time and issues specific to each country.  This 
variable, however, can easily create a positive bias in the results, leading to an 
overestimation of the effect of the common currency area on trade (Baldwin, 2006).  
For this reason, the most recent research tends to use panel analysis. 
One attempt to reconcile the differing models used throughout the history of the 
literature is the meta-analysis of Rose and Stanley (2005).  In this work, the authors 
aggregate the findings in the field before 2005 and estimate that the currency union 
effect increases trade by 30 to 90 percent.  This work makes no attempt to criticize the 
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previous research on the topic; instead, it identifies the average findings for the currency 
union effect on trade. 
An important note is that there will likely be errors in all trade data due to flawed 
collection techniques.  Baldwin (2005) argues that some possible areas of fault in 
international trade data include (1) inaccurate reporting of VAT statistics, (2) fraud in 
rules of origin reporting, (3) relative depreciation of the Euro and the dollar, and (4) 
other unknown errors (Baldwin, 2006). 
Missing Variables 
 Many authors have taken on the challenge of improving Rose’s estimations.  
Since 2000, their efforts have uncovered explanatory variables that tend to reduce the 
currency union effect.  The following gives a brief summary of some of the most notable 
additions to Rose’s original variables, concluding with the Glick and Rose (2001) 
dataset used in this study: 
1. Rose and van Wincoop (2001):  The authors argue that there is a need to 
consider the relative prices of exports and production in the two countries engaged in 
trade. They find that without this term, the Rose effect is greatly overestimated. 
2.  Micco, Stein, and Ordonez (2003):  These authors use their own dataset and 
include a lag variable.  This lag accounts for the time it usually takes to remove barriers 
to trade after common currency area formation (particularly relevant to the European 
Union).  The authors do not find that common currency leads to trade diversions for 
countries outside of the common currency area. Berger and Nitsch (2005) and Mongelli, 
Dorruci, and Agar (2005) both support this “lag” variable. 
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3. Eicher and Henn (2011) explain the need for a geography-based remoteness 
variable that was originally included in Rose (2000).  Second, the paper shows that 
there is also a need for country-fixed effects similar to what was used in Rose and van 
Wincoop (2001).  Eicher and Henn (2011) argues that the correlation between the two 
included variables carries significance and must be taken into consideration. 
4. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006): The authors show that the currency union effect 
differs by the currency used.  By instituting a dummy variable to categorize the currency 
used, they find variations across currencies.  
5. Glick and Rose (2001):  The authors update Rose’s original gravity model with 
a more current understanding of the theory behind the currency union effect by 
augmenting the dataset with more explanatory variables and correcting mistakes made 
in the original Rose dataset.  These additions help account for endogeneity issues.  The 
dataset has been made widely available and is used in much of the literature.  For these 
reasons and those discussed later in the paper, the present research uses the Glick and 
Rose dataset in combination with data on financial development. 
The role of financial development 
The second tier of literature pertinent to this paper addresses the role of financial 
development in the effect of common currency on trade.  While no work to date 
specifically tests this relationship, there is a significant amount of applicable research 
concerning the role of financial development in the effect of exchange rate volatility on 
trade.  Previous literature holds that exchange rate volatility is more damaging to trade 
in economies with less financial development.  The present research applies this 
assumption to the currency union effect on trade by arguing that financial development 
allows firms to hedge exchange rate risk, eliminate hysteresis, and overcome the large 
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fixed-costs of international commerce; thus, countries with less financial development 
may work to eliminate these barriers to trade by undergoing common currency 
formation.  The following addresses this literature and its relevance to the central 
hypothesis of this paper: the currency union effect on trade varies across levels of 
financial development. 
High levels of financial development offer firms the ability to trade more by 
channeling savings to the private sector.  Well-developed financial systems will allow 
firms to capitalize on economies of scale and take advantage of opportunities in the 
international market leading to increases in trade.  The most notable work on the 
financial development-trade nexus comes from Kletzer and Bardhan (1987).  The 
authors provide a theory for the impact of financial development on international trade 
and show that high levels of financial development give a comparative advantage to 
firms that require external financing. 
Beck (2002) adds to the theory proposed in Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) by 
conducting a study of manufacturing firms in 60 countries over 30 years.  By measuring 
how much firms export relative to the levels of financial development in their respective 
countries, Beck (2002) is able to show that firms operating in countries with higher 
financial development trade significantly more.  This work adds to the existing 
literature on financial development’s effect on trade, which shows that financial 
constraints tend to restrict export product scope, the quantity of trading partners, and 
the value of trade (Greenaway and Kneller, 2007; Muûls, 2008; Manova, 2013).   
Furthering this research, Manova (2013) uses a survey of over 100 countries and 
27 industrial sectors to further identify the implications of financial development on 
trade flows by explaining how “financial frictions” affect trade.  She finds three ways 
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through which financial development affects trade: (1) the selection of heterogeneous 
firms into domestic production, (2) the selection of domestic manufacturers in 
exporting, and (3) the level of firm exports (Manova, 2013).  Becker (2012) further 
backs the theory presented in Manova (2013) with an industry level study of the 
financial development-trade nexus and finds that manufacturing companies trade 
considerably more when aided by well-developed financial institutions. 
 An understanding of financial development’s effect on international trade helps 
provide a theory for the role of financial development in the currency union effect.  
Much of the literature addressing the role of financial development on the effectiveness 
of currency unions must be taken from the study of financial development’s role in 
minimizing the risks associated with exchange rate volatility.  Clark (1973) offers a 
theory of exchange rate volatility and trade that is dependent on financial development.  
Clark (1973) theorizes that firms trade less in countries with high exchange rate 
volatility; however, Clark (1973) argues that this effect can be offset by a well-
developed financial system (1973).  Hooper and Kohlhagen (1983) also show that firms 
trade less in the presence of high exchange rate volatility.  Hooper and Kohlhagen 
(1983) add to the findings of Clark (1973) by theorizing that firms operating in well-
developed financial systems have the ability to hedge risk through future market 
transactions and can therefore avoid the negative effects of exchange rate volatility 
(1983). 
Ethier (1973) further relaxes Clark’s theory and describes a situation in which 
firms operate with well-developed forward markets.  This allows firms to eliminate the 
risk associated with volatile exchange rates and strengthen trade relationships.  Ethier 
(1973) argues that through well-developed financial systems—manifest in effective 
forward markets—firms can alleviate the negative effects of exchange rate volatility; 
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consequently, the currency union effect should be minimized for firms operating in 
highly-developed financial systems. 
 Aghion et al. (2009) adds to the understanding of financial development’s role 
in international trade and economic growth.  The authors find that low levels of 
financial development tend to exacerbate the negative effects of credit market 
constraints.  This can lead to firm profit volatility thereby lowering investment and 
productivity.  The opposite is true of firms operating with high financial development: 
access to credit and a stable financial system leads to stable profit, more investment, 
and higher productivity.  In a panel analysis of firms in over 70 developed and emerging 
economies, Benhima (2012) backs the results of Aghion et al. (2009).  Both Benhima 
(2012) and Aghion (2009) endorse the establishment of exchange rate regimes under 
specific conditions of financial development, supporting the theory that the currency 
union effect could differ across levels of financial development. 
 A strong contribution to the literature comes from Chit and Judge (2011) who 
take firm-level data from East Asian countries between 1990 and 2006 to study the 
effect of financial development on exchange rate volatility.  They find that even when 
a firm faces imperfect hedging opportunities, it can protect itself from exchange rate 
volatility through a well-developed financial system.  The authors argue that firms will 
use a more stable foreign currency when their financial system permits it.  In addition, 
high levels of financial development allows firms to minimize risks associated with 
exchange rate volatility and allows firms to access more finance opportunities to further 
reduce risk (Chit and Judge, 2011). 
 Another theory of the role of financial development in the trade-exchange rate 
nexus is hysteresis.  This theory was first developed by Krugman (1986).  The theory 
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holds that firms trade less in the presence of high exchange rate volatility to avoid the 
costs associated with instability.  The negative effects of exchange rate volatility are 
amplified in this theory as firms are shown to make decisions based on a currency’s 
long-run reputation.  This is to say that firms are able to hedge short-term exchange rate 
risks with adequate financial development; however, firms will choose to leave or avoid 
entering markets with long-term exchange rate volatility (Krugman, 1986). 
 Krugman’s model is relevant to the study of financial development as it allows 
for firms to hedge exchange rate risks; consequently, firms operating in markets with 
high-financial development have the ability to maintain normal trade despite exchange 
rate volatility.  Héricourt and Pocet (2012) empirically back the theory of hysteresis 
using data from 100,000 Chinese exporters between 2000 and 2006.  The authors find 
that firms in areas with low-financial development are much less likely to enter markets 
with high exchange rate volatility because they are unable to hedge the exchange rate 
risks associated with the foreign market (Héricourt and Pocet, 2012). 
 In addition to the theories of hedging risk and avoiding hysteresis, the theory of 
fixed cost financing is also relevant to the study of financial development’s effect of 
the trade-exchange rate nexus.  This theory, used in Becker, Chen, and Greenberg 
(2012), holds that there are considerable fixed costs involved with international trade; 
therefore, firms with access to credit through high levels of domestic, financial 
development are more likely to trade internationally.  Similarly, these firms are likely 
to be highly mobile as they can afford to enter and exit markets in reaction to changing 
market conditions.  Becker, Chen, and Greenberg (2012) argue that firms without 
access to well-developed financial systems are less mobile.  When these firms are able 
to trade and conduct business in a foreign market, they are less able to leave this market 
in response to changing circumstances.  In a study of 170 countries between 1963 and 
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2000, Becker, Chen, and Greenberg show that trade between firms in countries with 
low levels of financial development are more negatively affected by exchange rate 
volatility than firms with access to highly-developed financial institutions (2012). 
 Greenaway and Kneller (2007) back this theory and provide a model that 
incorporates sunk costs.  Greenaway and Kneller (2007) shows that exchange rate 
volatility will lead to higher sunk costs for firms as resources are diverted to undergoing 
international exchanges.  Firms with access to high-levels of financial development will 
be able to continue to operate abroad by financing changes to international market 
strategy.  Firms operating in areas with low levels of financial development, however, 
are less mobile and cannot fund changes to their strategy.  The additional sunk costs 
associated with the changing exchange rate may cause these firms to drop out of the 
foreign market altogether.  The theory proposed in Aghion et al. (2009) backs the sunk 
cost theory proposed in Greenaway and Keller (2007) and Becker, Chen, and Greenberg 
(2012). 
 The theories of hedging exchange rate risk, hysteresis, and fixed cost financing 
relax the assumptions of the model first proposed in Clark (1973) by giving firms more 
mobility and resources to counter exchange rate volatility.  These extensions to the 
theory of financial development and its role in international trade provide a basis for 
much recent research and motivate the hypothesis of this paper.  The most recent study 
on the trade-exchange rate nexus and the role of financial development comes from 
Kliatskova (2013).  Kliatskova makes an important contribution to the literature by 
studying 1,560 country pairs between 1996 and 2010 to understand the importance of 
financial development in the effect of exchange rate volatility on trade.  She finds that 
countries with high financial development can nearly eliminate the effects of long-term 
15 
 
exchange rate volatility while countries with less financial development are more 
negatively affected by long-term exchange rate volatility. 
 The aforementioned research points to the importance of financial development 
in reducing the negative effects of exchange rate volatility.  The theories of hedging 
exchange rate risk, hysteresis, and fixed costs financing all help to strengthen the 
understanding of the role of financial development in the currency union effect.  To 
date, however, no research has studied the role of financial development in respect to 
the currency union effect.  The purpose of the subsequent research is to test the 
hypothesis that firms operating in markets with low levels of financial development 
will trade more as the result of currency union formation compared to firms operating 
with high-levels of financial development.  This theory is motivated by the assumption 
that currency unions should increase trade by more in less-financially developed 
economies as common currency formation gives firms in economies with low financial 
development the ability to hedge risk, avoid hysteresis, and minimize the costs of 
operating abroad. 
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Methodology 
 The hypothesis that the currency union effect on trade depends on levels of 
financial development is tested by combining trade and currency union data from Glick 
and Rose (2001) and financial development data created by Beck, Loayza, and Levine 
(1999).  This is the first time that these datasets have been considered together.  Like 
Glick and Rose (2001), this paper will use the gravity model as a baseline model for 
analysis.  To this model, the research will add financial development indicators to test 
the hypothesis. 
Basic Model Specification 
 Most analyses of the currency union effect on trade use a variation of the gravity 
model.  This model holds that trade levels are determined by the relative size of the 
trading partner’s economies and the geographical distance between them.  Many 
researchers add to the gravity model for further accuracy by including measures such 
as common language, trade agreement status, and colonial relationships (Rose, 2000; 
Tenreyro, 2007).  This study will use the model first developed in Glick and Rose 
(2001):  
 ltrade= f (landl, island, border, comlang, comcol, comctry, colony, curcol, cu,  
regional, lareap, ldist, lrgdp, lrgdppc) 
where landl determines whether or not a country is landlocked, island identifies island 
nations, border describes whether or not trading partners share a border, comlang 
identifies countries that share a common language, comctry determines if the trading 
partners are located within the same country, colony recognizes trading partners that 
were once in a colony-colonizer relationship, curcol identifies current colonies, cu 
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identifies countries currently involved in a currency union, regional determines 
whether the trading partners are involved in a trade agreement, lareap is the log of the 
product of the area of trading partners, ldist is the log of the distance between the two 
countries, lrgdp is the log of the product of the two countries’ real GDP, and lrgdppc is 
the log of the product of the two countries’ GDP per capita. 
 To the Glick and Rose Model, this study adds the indicators of financial 
development developed by Beck, Loayza, and Levine (1999): the ratio of commercial 
bank assets to total assets, the quantity of private credit relative to GDP, and the quantity 
of liquid liabilities relative to GDP.  In order to account for the role that these measures 
play in the currency union effect on trade, interaction variables with the currency union 
dummy are included for each measure of financial development.  This results in a model 
that should capture the effect of financial development on the currency union effect: 
ln(Xijt) = β0 + β1landlt + β2island + β3border + β4comlang + β5comcol + 
β6comctry + β7colony + β8curcol + β9CU + β10regional + β11lareap + β12ldist + 
β13lrgdp + β14lrgdppc + β15financial development indicator + β16CUijt*financial 
development + εijt 
 
Where i and j are countries and t is time.  The variables, as described in Glick and Rose 
(2001), are defined as: 
Xijt represents the average value of real bilateral trade between countries i and 
j at time t.  Y is real GDP.  Pop is population.  D is the distance between i and j.  
Lang is a binary variable which is unity if countries i and j have a common 
language.  Cont is a binary variable which is unity if countries i and j share a 
land border.  FTA is a binary variable which is unity if countries i and j belong 
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to the same regional trade agreement.  Landl is the number of landlocked 
countries in the country-pair (0, 1, or 2).  Island is the number of island nations 
in the pair (0, 1, or 2).  Area is the land mass of the country.  ComCol is a binary 
variable which is unity if countries i and j were ever colonies after 1945 with 
the same colonizer.  CurCol is a binary variable which is unity if countries i and 
j are colonies at time t.  Colony is a binary variable which is unity if country i 
ever colonized j or vice versa.  ComNat is a binary variable which is unity if 
countries i and j remained part of the same nation during the sample (e.g., France 
and Guadeloupe, or the UK and Bermuda).  CU is a binary variable which is 
unity if countries i and j use the same currency at time t.  εij represents the myriad 
other influences on bilateral exports, assumed to be well behaved (Glick and 
Rose, 2001). 
The coefficient β15 denotes the effect of the product of each specific financial 
development indicator for each regression.  β16 acts as the coefficient for the interaction 
term between currency union and the specific measure of financial development.  This 
study will carry out three independent regressions to study the effect of each individual 
financial development observation. 
 The impact of each measure of financial development on trade will be measured 
using the following equation: 
Net currency union effect= β9CU + β16 CU*(mean financial development) 
where β9 captures the trade impact of two countries using the same currency and β16 
predicts the change in the log of bilateral trade for a unit change in financial 
development for two trade partners using a common currency.  Together, β9 and β16 
captures the net effect of currency union formation, accounting for levels of financial 
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development.  These results are limited in that they focus on the cumulative level of 
financial development between two trade partners.   
For policy purposes, it is useful to know the effect of specific levels of financial 
development.  To address this concern, the paper categorizes countries with high levels 
of financial development and countries with low levels of financial development.  The 
paper then runs regressions using dummy variables for differing levels of financial 
development:  FD_LL—unity when both trading partners have low levels of financial 
development, FD_HL—unity when one trading partner with high financial 
development trades with a nation of low financial development, and FD_HH—unity 
when both trading partners have high levels of financial development. 
Data  
The role of financial development on the currency union effect is studied using 
over 117,000 observations of bilateral trade and levels of financial development 
between 1960 and 1997.  As is common in the literature, the observations are formatted 
for panel-data analysis using bilateral trade data obtained from the IMF Direction of 
Trade Statistics and financial development indicators taken from the World Bank 
Development Indicators database.2 
The Gravity Model of Trade 
 The analysis is based on the gravity model in which trade flows are a function 
of both the incomes of the trading partners and the distance between them.  As 
                                                          
2 Made available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm#CUTrade 
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previously addressed, this paper uses the Glick and Rose (2001) data to replicate the 
gravity model. 
Measuring Financial Development 
 To measure levels of financial development, this paper uses the financial 
development indicators created by Beck, Loayza, and Levine (1999).  These measures 
attempt to quantify the effectiveness, size, and structure of a country’s bank-based 
financial sector.  This research uses the three indicators developed by Beck, Loayza, 
and Levine (1999): the ratio of commercial bank assets to total financial assets, the 
quantity of available private credit relative to GDP, and the quantity of liquid liabilities 
relative to GDP.  The authors explain that these measures improve on previous attempts 
to quantify financial development by “(i) more accurately deflating nominal measures 
of intermediary liabilities and assets, (ii) more comprehensively measuring the banking 
sector, and (iii) more carefully distinguishing who is conducting the intermediation and 
to where the funds are flowing” (King and Levine 2000, 261).  These measures are 
commonly used in the literature and built on the work of King and Levine (1993). 
 The first measure of financial development is the ratio of commercial bank 
assets to all financial assets.  The indicator is equal to the ratio of commercial bank 
assets divided by commercial bank assets plus central bank assets.  While not an exact 
measure of the quality of financial systems in the market, the ratio of commercial bank 
assets to all financial assets gives an indication of the extent that commercial banks in 
an economy allocate savings relative to central banks.  This is significant given that 
commercial banks will be more likely to allocate savings more efficiently than central 
banks through greater capacity to identify profitable investment, monitor managers, 
manage risk, and create more access to funds (King and Levine, 2000).   
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 The quantity of private credit relative to GDP is a measure of the total value of 
credit given to the private sector by financial intermediaries divided by GDP.  Private 
credit, like measures of commercial bank assets, is a useful measure of the quality of 
financial systems as it only measures the private credit available in an economy, which 
is generally thought to be more efficiently allocated than public credit.  Beck, Loayza, 
and Levine (1999) see private credit measures as an improvement on previous measures 
of financial development because it provides a more accurate measure of the amount of 
financial services available in a market. 
The quantity of liquid liabilities relative to GDP is a measure of the depth of a 
financial system.  This indicator is equal to the liquid liabilities of the financial system 
(“currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and non-bank financial 
intermediaries”) divided by GDP (King and Levine, 2000: 259).  This is the most 
widely used indicator of the size of the financial system in a country (King and Levine 
1994).  This measure does not provide an indicator of the effectiveness of the financial 
system, but many find it indicative of financial development (Goldsmith, 1969; King 
and Levine, 1993; and McKinnon, 1973). 
 Together, the measures of financial development in Beck, Loayza, and Levine 
(1999) should provide a strong indication of the relative level of financial development 
in a given country.  These measures of financial development, added to the Glick and 
Rose trade data, should provide evidence for testing the central hypothesis of this paper.  
The trade data comes from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics and is made available 
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by Andrew Rose.3  The financial development indicators are taken from the World 
Bank’s Development Indicators via the ProQuest database.4 
The wide distribution of levels of financial development across countries makes 
classifying the relative levels of financial development difficult.  Similarly, it is difficult 
to give a definite level of financial development that can be called “high” or “low.”  
Clearly, these classifications are not perfect, but following the guidelines set by Beck 
et al. (1999) and giving a wide enough separation between the countries considered to 
have high financial development and those considered to have low financial 
development, should make for useful classifications. 
The paper uses the median as the midpoint and categorizes high ratios of 
commercial bank assets to be in the 70th percentile (over 96.12) of all observations.  
Nations in the bottom 30th percentile (below 79.57) are considered to have low levels 
of financial development.  It is necessary to use the 30th and 70th percentile as opposed 
to a smaller difference such as the 40th and 60th percentiles because several nations have 
fluctuating ratios of commercial bank assets that move them from the 40th percentile to 
the 60th percentile and back within a short amount of time.  There are no such 
fluctuations between observations in the 30th and 70th percentile.  As a benchmark for 
comparison, it is worth noting that Beck et al. identifies the average level of commercial 
bank assets for developed nations to be 85 percent and for developing nations to be 50 
percent (1999).  Graph 1 presents the distribution of the ratio of commercial bank assets 
across all observations: 
 
                                                          
3 Available at <http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm#CUTrade> 
4 Available at <http://0-data-
planet.conquestsystems.com.umiss.lib.olemiss.edu/statistical/Main.jsp;jsessionid=6F4429D2D1CFE29
BAA4CD67D864828BA?dataplanet=true>. 
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Graph 1 Commercial-Central Bank Assets Distribution 
 
Low levels of private credit are assumed to be below 31.45 percent and high 
levels are assumed to be above 52.56 percent.  These boundaries distinguish nations 
with low levels of financial development as those within the 40th percentile of private 
credit and nations with high levels of financial development to be within the 60th 
percentile.  The median of private credit across all observations is 41.82 percent.  The 
observations also closely resemble the average levels of private credit for developing 
nations (30 percent) and developed nations (60 percent) (Beck et al. 1999).  Graph 2 
gives the distribution of private credit: 
Graph 2 Private Credit Distribution 
 
24 
 
Low levels of liquid liabilities are considered to be below 41.66 percent of GDP 
while high levels of liquid liabilities are considered to be above 56.72 percent of GDP.  
These boundaries represent the 40th percentile and 60th percentile of all observations, 
respectively.  It is helpful to consider that Beck et al. identifies levels of liquid liabilities 
for developing countries to be 30 percent and 60 percent for developed countries 
(1999). 
Graph 3 Liquid Liabilities Distribution 
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Empirical Results 
This study first uses pooled OLS.  Assuming that bilateral trade relationships 
have unique characteristics, this paper will then use a fixed effects approach to account 
for unobserved, time-invariant variables that may be correlated with the observed 
explanatory variables.  Next, a time-fixed effects approach is used to account for 
variation across the timespan of the data (1960-1997).  Last, the paper accounts for both 
time and entity effects using a combined time-fixed effect and entity-fixed effect 
approach.  To further test the hypothesis that low levels of financial development make 
for more effective currency unions, the estimated currency union effect for the top 10 
most financially developed economies for each indicator are compared to the 10 least 
financially developed economies for each indicator. 
 
Pooled OLS 
 Following the original analysis of Glick and Rose (2001), this paper first uses 
pooled OLS to estimate the currency union effect on trade.  To this model, the 
aforementioned financial development indicators are added.5  
 Importantly, the regression very closely replicates the original results from the 
Glick and Rose analysis.  This paper finds a coefficient of 1.34 on the currency union 
dummy variable meaning that countries with a currency union are estimated to trade 
3.8 times (380 percent) more with one another (e1.34= 3.81) compared to countries using 
                                                          
5 In this and all subsequent tables, the ratio of commercial bank assets to total asset is denoted “CCB,” 
the quantity of private credit relative to GDP is denoted “PC,” and the quantity of liquid liabilities 
relative to GDP is denoted “LL.” 
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their national currencies.6  The original Glick and Rose paper finds a coefficient of 1.3 
(interpreted as an increase of 370 percent in trade). 
Commercial Bank Assets 
Pooled OLS results accounting for commercial bank assets are given in Table 1.7 
Table 1 Observations CU Interaction Net 
CCB Data 105,119 1.43*** 
(.05) 
[27.7] 
------------------------------------------ 1.43 
CCB12 105,119 .91*** 
(.16) 
[5.67] 
.00003 
(.00002) 
[1.59] 
----------- 
CCB_HH 130 1.37*** 
(.05) 
[25.91] 
.66*** 
(.19) 
[3.41] 
2.03 
(.18) 
[10.78] 
CCB_HL 40 1.45*** 
(.05) 
[28.01] 
-.09 
(.33) 
[-0.28] 
----------- 
CCB_LL 497 1.32*** 
(.05) 
[22.55] 
.08 
(.10) 
[0.82] 
----------- 
All 
Interactions 
HH 
130 
HL 
40 
LL 
497 
1.29*** 
(.06) 
[20.92] 
HH 
.52*** 
(.19) 
[2.69] 
HL 
-.11 
(.33) 
[-.34] 
LL 
.11 
(.11) 
[.319] 
----------- 
Note—Coefficients with a p-value less than .05 are identified with a *; less than .1 a **; and less than 
.01 with a *** 
The interaction term of currency union effect and commercial bank assets is 
insignificant.  The currency union effect is found to increase trade by 344 percent (e2.03 
                                                          
6 Using 219,558 observations with 99% confidence 
7 In this table, and subsequent tables, commercial to central bank assets ratio is abbreviated as 
CCB.  The cumulative ratio for both trade partners in an observation is abbreviated as CCB12.  
CCB_HH represents the interaction for currency union and trade between countries with high 
commercial bank asset ratios.  CCB_HL represents the interaction dummy for currency union 
and trade between country pairs where one partner has low levels of commercial bank assets 
and the other has high levels of commercial bank assets.  CCB_LL signifies the interaction 
dummy for currency union and trade between countries with low levels of commercial bank 
assets. The currency union effect is represented by CU.   The interaction estimate is 
given under interaction, and the net effect for both the currency union effect and the 
interaction estimate is given under net. 
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– e1.43 = 3.44) for trade between two partners with high levels of commercial bank 
assets.  The interaction for trade between one economy with high financial development 
and one with low financial development is insignificant. The interaction for two 
economies with low financial development is also insignificant.     
Next, a comparison is made to estimate the currency union effect of the 10 
economies with the highest levels of commercial bank assets against the 10 economies 
with the lowest levels of commercial bank assets.  Under the pooled OLS model, the 
currency union effect for the 10 nations with the highest levels of commercial bank 
assets is 40 percent larger than for the 10 nations with lowest levels of financial 
development.  This contradicts the original hypothesis; however, this paper holds that 
the pooled OLS model omits significant time and entity variables.  In addition, the wide 
standard error makes these results inconclusive.  The estimates are found in Table 2:8 
Table 2 CCB, Pooled OLS 
Top 10 CCB   Bottom 10 CCB   
Country Avg CU Effect Country Avg Pooled OLS 
Austria 7525.76 1.13 Afghanistan 887.11 0.93 
Bahamas 7382.45 1.13 Angola 2584.23 0.98 
France 7417.97 1.13 Bolivia 3607.23 1.01 
Germany 7459.49 1.13 Burma 2624.33 0.98 
Ireland 7208.96 1.12 Cape Verde 2307.76 0.97 
Kuwait 7569.49 1.13 Haiti 2391.40 0.98 
Netherlands 7486.10 1.13 Liberia 2126.33 0.97 
Thailand 6476.31 1.10 Nicaragua 4808.68 1.05 
Singapore 7962.14 1.14 Sierre Leone 3093.03 1.00 
UAE 6873.76 1.11 Uganda 2421.92 0.98 
All 7336.24 1.13 (.29) All 2685.20 0.99 (.10) 
                                                          
8 The Table is divided into parts: (1) the 10 countries with the highest levels of CCB and (2) 
the 10 countries with the lowest levels of CCB.  In Columns 2 and 5, the average cumulative 
level of CCB is given for the country and its trading partners.  In Columns 3 and 6, the net 
currency union effect is calculated based on the averages in columns 2 and 5.  The standard 
error is reported in parentheses.  This design is used in all subsequent tables by replacing CCB 
with PC for Private Credit and LL for Liquid Liabilities. 
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Private Credit 
Table 3 Observations CU Interaction Net 
PC Data 117,897 1.77*** 
(.06) 
[29.53] 
------------------------------------------- 1.77 
 
PC12 117,897 1.81*** 
(.07) 
[25.43] 
-.0001** 
(.00004) 
[-2.65] 
1.62 
(.06) 
[23.44] 
 
PC_HH 42 1.787*** 
(.061) 
[29.27] 
-.630 
(.330) 
[-1.91] 
----------- 
PC_HL 51 1.815*** 
(.061) 
[29.61] 
-.911** 
(.292) 
[-3.12] 
.904 
(.28) 
[3.16] 
PC_LL 868 1.789*** 
(.097) 
[18.39] 
-.046 
(.119) 
[-0.39] 
----------- 
All 
Interactions 
HH 
42 
HL 
51 
LL 
868 
2.03*** 
(.10) 
[18.84] 
HH 
-1.06** 
(.33) 
[-3.15] 
HL 
-1.10*** 
(.304) 
[-3.36] 
LL 
-.329** 
(.127) 
[-2.58] 
-.468 
(.48) 
[-0.97] 
Note—Coefficients with a p-value less than .05 are identified with a *; less than .1 a **; and less than 
.01 with a *** 
The results for the Pooled OLS model accounting for private credit are given in 
Table 3.9  The model holds that the cumulative effect of private credit on the currency 
union effect to be statistically significant, lowering the currency union effect by 81 
percent.  This drop would be greater for trade partners with higher levels of cumulative 
private credit.  
                                                          
9 In this table, and subsequent tables, levels of private credit is abbreviated as PC.  The 
cumulative level of private credit for both trade partners in an observation is abbreviated 
as PC12.  PC_HH represents the interaction for currency union and trade between 
countries with high levels of private credit.  PC_HL represents the interaction dummy 
for currency union and trade between country pairs where one partner has low levels of 
private credit and the other has high levels of private credit.  PC_LL signifies the 
interaction dummy for currency union and trade between countries with low levels of 
private credit.  The currency union effect is represented by CU.   The interaction 
estimate is given under interaction, and the net effect for both the currency union effect 
and the interaction estimate is given under net. 
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Including dummy variables for the levels of private credit has significance for 
trade between one economy with high financial development and one economy with 
low financial development.  In this instance, the currency union effect falls by 340 
percent.  The other dummy interactions are insignificant under the pooled OLS model. 
A comparison of the estimates for the currency union effect on the 10 countries 
with the highest private credit against the 10 countries with the lowest levels of private 
credit under pooled OLS is given in Table 4.  Under the pooled OLS model, the 
currency union effect is predicted to be 137 percent weaker for countries with higher 
levels of private credit.  While this evidence supports the original hypothesis, it remains 
inconclusive because of issues with the pooled OLS model discussed later in this paper.  
Table 4 PC, Pooled OLS 
Top 10 PC   Bottom 10 PC   
Country Avg Pooled OLS Country Avg Pooled OLS 
Japan 4103.99 1.39 Armenia 100.69 1.79 
Cyprus 2666.04 1.54 DRC 15.46 1.80 
Switzerland 3678.27 1.44 Tanzania 135.15 1.79 
Hong Kong 3245.09 1.48 Azerbaijan 48.88 1.80 
Thailand 1324.68 1.67 Ukraine 34.17 1.80 
USA 3430.31 1.46 Uganda 91.00 1.80 
Sweden 2587.33 1.55 Angola 51.36 1.80 
United Kingdom 3992.91 1.41 Ghana 85.48 1.80 
South Africa 2077.29 1.60 Syria 215.14 1.78 
Germany 3530.04 1.45 Haiti 360.03 1.77 
All 3063.59 1.53 (.24) All 113.74 1.79 (.01) 
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Liquid Liabilities 
Table 5 Observations CU Interaction Net 
LL Data 118,381 1.80*** 
(.06) 
[29.95] 
------------------------------------------- 1.80 
LL12 118,381 1.85*** 
(.07) 
[24.66] 
-.000054 
(.00004) 
[-1.28] 
----------- 
LL_HH 85 1.83*** 
(.061) 
[29.62] 
-.425 
(.233) 
[-1.82] 
----------- 
 
LL_HL 96 1.876*** 
(.062) 
[29.89] 
-.788*** 
(.216) 
[-3.65] 
1.088 
(.20) 
[5.25] 
LL_LL 971 1.548*** 
(.112) 
[13.76] 
.401*** 
(.130) 
[3.07] 
1.949 
(.06) 
[27.90] 
All 
Interactions 
HH 
84 
HL 
96 
LL 
971 
1.921*** 
(.160) 
[11.99] 
HH 
-.634* 
(.271) 
[-2.34] 
HL 
-.819** 
(.261) 
[-3.13] 
LL 
.022 
(.17) 
[0.13] 
----------- 
Note—Coefficients with a p-value less than .05 are identified with a *; less than .1 a **; and less than 
.01 with a *** 
The pooled OLS estimate of the currency union effect on trade accounting for 
levels of liquid liabilities is given in Table 5.10  The impact of the cumulative level of 
liquid liabilities on the currency union effect under the pooled OLS model is not 
statistically significant.  Creating a dummy variable for trade between two countries 
where one trade partner has a high level of liquid liabilities and the other has a low level 
of liquid liabilities lowers the currency union effect by as much as 308 percent.  
                                                          
10 In this table, and subsequent tables, levels of liquid liabilities is abbreviated as LL.  
The cumulative level of liquid liabilities for both trade partners in an observation is 
abbreviated as LL12.  LL_HH represents the interaction for currency union and trade 
between countries with high levels of liquid liabilities.  LL_HL represents the 
interaction dummy for currency union and trade between country pairs where one 
partner has low levels of liquid liabilities and the other has high levels of liquid 
liabilities.  LL_LL signifies the interaction dummy for currency union and trade 
between countries with low levels of liquid liabilities.  The currency union effect is 
represented by CU.   The interaction estimate is given under interaction, and the net 
effect for both the currency union effect and the interaction estimate is given under net. 
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Including a dummy variable that accounts for trade between countries with low levels 
of liquid liabilities increases the currency union effect by 112 percent. 
 The estimate for the currency union effect on the 10 nations with the most liquid 
liabilities is compared to the estimate for the currency union effect on the 10 nations 
with the least liquid liabilities.  The pooled OLS model predicts a stronger currency 
union effect for countries with lower levels of liquid liabilities by 107 percent.  These 
finding supports the original hypothesis, but should be seen as inconclusive given the 
large standard error. The results are given in Table 6: 
Table 6 LL, Pooled OLS 
 
  
Top 10 LL   Bottom 10 LL   
Country Avg Pooled OLS Country Avg Pooled OLS 
Japan 5728.11 1.54 Armenia 202.73 1.83 
Malta 5482.29 1.55 Guinnea-Bissau 271.46 1.83 
Hong Kong 5380.13 1.55 Bhutan 261.79 1.83 
Switzerland 4850.04 1.58 Gabon 486.81 1.82 
Cyprus 3533.46 1.65 DRC 148.91 1.84 
Malaysia 2942.73 1.69 El Salvador 313.24 1.83 
Singapore 3152.43 1.67 Costa Rica 1253.67 1.78 
Portugal 2946.63 1.69 Uganda 312.20 1.83 
Austria 3032.06 1.68 Tanzania 512.41 1.82 
United Kingdom 3361.93 1.66 Bolivia 968.24 1.79 
All 4040.98 1.63 (.32) All 473.15 1.82 (.03) 
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Fixed Effects 
The pooled OLS model does not allow the explanatory variables to be correlated 
with time-invariant, unobserved country-pair characteristics that affect trade.  To allow 
for this correlation, this paper employs a fixed-effects model.  Table 7 gives the fixed 
effects results from estimating the currency union effect on trade when taking into 
account the level of financial development. 
These findings suggest that joining a currency union will increase bilateral trade 
by 90 percent (e.65= 1.9).11  The estimate is statistically significant and offers baseline 
significance for comparing results based on differing levels of financial development. 
Commercial Bank Assets  
Table 7 Observations CU Interaction Net 
CCB Data 105,119 .328*** 
(.13) 
[3.78] 
------------- .328 
CCB12 105,119 .90*** 
(.13) 
[6.57] 
-.0001*** 
(.00001) 
[-6.44] 
.159 
(.08) 
[1.83] 
CCB_HH 130 .347*** 
(.08) 
[3.99] 
-.49*** 
(.12) 
[-3.87] 
-.149 
(.14) 
[-1.00] 
CCB_HL 40 .334*** 
(.086) 
[3.85] 
-.307 
(.21) 
[-1.42] 
--------- 
CCB_LL 497 .187** 
(.09) 
[2.05] 
.365*** 
(.07) 
[4.62] 
.551 
(.10) 
[5.52] 
All 
Interactions 
HH 
130 
HL 
40 
LL 
497 
.224*** 
(.09) 
[2.43] 
HH 
-.45*** 
(.12) 
[-3.54] 
HL 
-.27 
(.21) 
[-1.26] 
LL 
.32*** 
(.08) 
[4.02] 
--------- 
Note—Coefficients with a p-value less than .05 are identified with a *; less than .1 a **; and less than 
.01 with a *** 
  
                                                          
11 Using 219,558 observations with 99% confidence 
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First, the effect of commercial bank assets on the currency union effect is tested 
under the fixed effects model.  Under this model, the cumulative ratio of commercial 
bank assets to all financial assets is significant and decreases the currency union effect 
by 21 percent at the mean.  At higher levels of cumulative, commercial bank assets, a 
greater negative effect occurs.  At lower levels of commercial bank assets, the currency 
union effect is greater.   
Including a dummy variable for trade partners that both have high levels of 
commercial bank assets is also significant.  The findings imply that when countries that 
both have high levels of financial development trade together, the currency union effect 
falls by 52 percent.   This model also predicts that when both trading partners have low 
levels of financial development, the currency union effect is 34 percent stronger.  The 
model finds no significance for trade between an economy with high financial 
development and an economy with low financial development. 
 The currency union effect estimates of the 10 economies with the highest levels 
of commercial bank assets are now compared to the 10 economies with the least 
commercial bank assets.  Using the fixed effects model, the paper finds that the 
currency union effect is 73 percent stronger for countries with the least developed 
financial systems.  This result supports the original hypothesis.  The results are given 
in Table 8. 
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Table 8 CCB, Fixed Effects 
Top 10 CCB   Bottom 10 CCB   
Country Avg Fixed Effects Country Avg Fixed Effects 
Austria 7525.76 0.14 Afghanistan 887.11 0.81 
Bahamas 7382.45 0.16 Angola 2584.23 0.64 
France 7417.97 0.15 Bolivia 3607.23 0.53 
Germany 7459.49 0.15 Burma 2624.33 0.63 
Ireland 7208.96 0.17 Cape Verde 2307.76 0.66 
Kuwait 7569.49 0.14 Haiti 2391.40 0.66 
Netherlands 7486.10 0.15 Liberia 2126.33 0.68 
Thailand 6476.31 0.25 Nicaragua 4808.68 0.41 
Singapore 7962.14 0.10 Sierre Leone 3093.03 0.59 
UAE 6873.76 0.21 Uganda 2421.92 0.65 
All 7336.24 0.16 (.14) All 2685.20 0.63 (.05) 
 
Private Credit 
Table 9  Observations CU Interaction Net 
PC Data 117,897 .93*** 
(.12) 
[7.79] 
------------------------------------------ .93 
PC12 117,897 .98*** 
(.12) 
[7.96] *** 
-.0000944 
(.00005) 
[-1.69] 
--------- 
PC_HH 42 .934*** 
(.120) 
[7.78] 
.014 
(.219) 
[0.07] 
--------- 
PC_HL 51 1.00*** 
(.124) 
[8.09] 
-.532* 
(.251) 
[-2.12] 
.473 
(.24) 
[1.89] 
PC_LL 868 .788*** 
(.143) 
[5.50] 
.217 
(.114) 
[1.91] 
--------- 
All 
Interactions 
HH 
42 
HL 
51 
LL 
868 
.871*** 
(.15) 
[5.78] 
HH 
-.023 
(.22) 
[-.11] 
HL 
-.463 
(.256) 
[-1.80] 
LL 
.181 
(.115) 
[1.57] 
--------- 
Note—Coefficients with a p-value less than .05 are identified with a *; less than .1 a **; and less than 
.01 with a *** 
Next, this paper tests the significance of the level of private credit access in a 
given country.  The fixed effects model predicts an insignificant coefficient for the 
cumulative level of private credit.  The currency union effect does not differ for country 
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pairs where both partners have high levels of private credit or for trade between 
countries that both have low levels of financial development.  Where one trade partner 
has a high level of private credit and the other has a low level of private credit, the 
currency union effect falls by 94 percent; however, this estimate is only significant at 
the 5 percent level.  
Table 10 presents the results of estimating the currency union effect for 
countries with the 10 highest levels of private credit against the estimate for the 
currency union effect for the 10 countries with the lowest levels of private credit.  
Similar to the original hypothesis, the results estimate that the currency union effect 
will be 62 percent stronger for the 10 nations with the least amount of private credit; 
however these results are inconclusive given the wide standard error. 
Table 10 PC, Fixed Effects 
Top 10 PC   Bottom 10 PC   
Country Avg Fixed Effects Country Avg Fixed Effects 
Japan 4103.99 0.59 Armenia 100.69 0.97 
Cyprus 2666.04 0.72 DRC 15.46 0.97 
Switzerland 3678.27 0.63 Tanzania 135.15 0.96 
Hong Kong 3245.09 0.67 Azerbaijan 48.88 0.97 
Thailand 1324.68 0.85 Ukraine 34.17 0.97 
USA 3430.31 0.65 Uganda 91.00 0.97 
Sweden 2587.33 0.73 Angola 51.36 0.97 
United Kingdom 3992.91 0.60 Ghana 85.48 0.97 
South Africa 2077.29 0.78 Syria 215.14 0.95 
Germany 3530.04 0.64 Haiti 360.03 0.94 
All 3063.59 0.69 (.84) All 113.74 .96 (.03) 
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Liquid Liabilities 
Table 11 Observations CU Interaction Net 
LL Data 118,381 
 
.98*** 
(.12) 
[8.07] 
----------------------------------------- .98 
LL12 118,381 1.02*** 
(.13) 
[7.52] 
-.00003 
(.000065) 
[-.55] 
--------- 
LL_HH 85 .988*** 
(.122) 
[8.07] 
-.122 
(.177) 
[-0.69] 
--------- 
LL_HL 96 1.07*** 
(.130) 
[8.25] 
-.452* 
(.224) 
[-2.02] 
.625 
(.217) 
[2.88] 
LL_LL 971 .774*** 
(.170) 
[4.53] 
.309 
(.167) 
[1.85] 
--------- 
All Interactions HH 
85 
HL 
96 
LL 
971 
.922*** 
(.195) 
[4.72] 
HH 
-.171 
(.179) 
[-.95] 
HL 
-.378 
(.243) 
[-1.55] 
LL 
.204 
(.179) 
[1.14] 
--------- 
Note—Coefficients with a p-value less than .05 are identified with a *; less than .1 a **; and less than 
.01 with a *** 
The interaction term between liquid liabilities and the currency union dummy 
proves to be insignificant for the cumulative level of liquid liabilities.  When the 
regression includes a dummy variable for trade between two partners with low levels 
of liquid liabilities or two countries with high levels of financial development, the 
interaction is also insignificant.   
A significant interaction is found by including a dummy for trade between one 
partner with high levels of liquid liabilities and one partner with low levels of liquid 
liabilities.  In this instance, the model estimates that the currency union effect falls by 
80 percent; however, the results are only significant at the 5 percent level. 
Table 12 presents a comparison between the estimates for the 10 nations with 
the highest levels of liquid liabilities and the 10 countries with the lowest levels of 
liquid liabilities.  The findings hold that the currency union effect is expected to be 28 
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percent higher for the 10 economies with the lowest levels of liquid liabilities.  These 
results should be considered inconclusive given the wide standard error. 
Table 12 Liquid Liabilities, Fixed Effects 
Top 10 LL   Bottom 10 LL   
Country Avg Fixed Effects Country  Avg Fixed Effects 
Japan 5728.11 0.84 Armenia 202.73 1.01 
Malta 5482.29 0.85 Guinnea-Bissau 271.46 1.01 
Hong Kong 5380.13 0.85 Bhutan 261.79 1.01 
Switzerland 4850.04 0.87 Gabon 486.81 1.00 
Cyprus 3533.46 0.91 DRC 148.91 1.01 
Malaysia 2942.73 0.93 El Salvador 313.24 1.01 
Singapore 3152.43 0.92 Costa Rica 1253.67 0.98 
Portugal 2946.63 0.93 Uganda 312.20 1.01 
Austria 3032.06 0.92 Tanzania 512.41 1.00 
United Kingdom 3361.93 0.91 Bolivia 968.24 0.99 
All 4040.98 .89 (.52) All 473.15 1.00 (.06) 
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Time-Fixed Effects 
 This model accounts for changes across time by creating dummy variables for 
each year in the dataset (1960-1995).  This model will likely help to account for trends 
in trade flow across time caused by exogenous historical factors, such as those 
explained in Campbell (2012).  The initial regression gives a coefficient of .58 for the 
currency union dummy, implying an increase in trade of 78 percent as a result of 
currency union formation (not accounting for financial development).12  
Commercial Bank Assets 
Table 13 Observations CU Interaction Net 
CCB Data 145,389 .37*** 
(.081) 
[4.61] 
------------- .37 
CCB12 145,389 .830*** 
(.134) 
[6.20] 
-.0000959*** 
(.0000181) 
[-5.29] 
.227 
(.08) 
[2.81] 
CCB_HH 130 .389*** 
(.081) 
[4.79] 
-.417** 
(.127) 
[-3.27] 
-.028 
(.14) 
[-0.19] 
CCB_HL 40 .386*** 
(.081) 
[4.76] 
-.390 
(.214) 
[-1.82] 
--------- 
CCB_LL 497 .266** 
(.085) 
[3.10] 
.28*** 
(.078) 
[3.59] 
.546 
(.09) 
[5.74] 
All 
Interactions 
HH 
130 
HL 
40 
LL 
497 
.304*** 
(.086) 
[3.51] 
HH 
-.408*** 
(.128) 
[-3.16] 
HL 
-.383 
(.215) 
[-1.78] 
LL 
.246*** 
(.079) 
[3.10] 
--------- 
Note—Coefficients with a p-value less than .05 are identified with a *; less than .1 a **; and less than 
.01 with a *** 
 The time-fixed effects model supports the general interpretation of the fixed-
effects model.  At the average cumulative ratio of commercial to central bank assets, 
the currency union effect is 20 percent lower.  The currency union effect is further 
                                                          
12 Using 219,558 observations with 99% confidence 
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weakened at higher cumulative levels of commercial to central bank assets.  When both 
trade partners have high levels of commercial to central bank assets, the currency union 
effect falls by 47 percent and actually leads to a negative trade effect.  When both 
nations have low levels of financial development, the currency union effect is 28 
percent stronger. 
 Next, time-fixed estimates for the net currency union effect for the 10 countries 
with the highest commercial bank assets to the estimate of the currency union effect for 
the countries with the 10 highest levels of central bank assets are compared.  The results, 
given in Table 14, support the original hypothesis.   Under the time-fixed effects model, 
the 10 least financially developed economies have a currency union effect that is 63 
percent stronger than for the 10 most financially developed economies. 
Table 14 CCB, Time-Fixed Effects 
Top 10 CCB   Bottom 10 CCB   
Country  Avg Time Effects Country Avg Time Effects 
Austria 7525.76 0.10 Afghanistan 887.11 0.74 
Bahamas 7382.45 0.12 Angola 2584.23 0.58 
France 7417.97 0.11 Bolivia 3607.23 0.48 
Germany 7459.49 0.11 Burma 2624.33 0.57 
Ireland 7208.96 0.13 Cape Verde 2307.76 0.60 
Kuwait 7569.49 0.10 Haiti 2391.40 0.60 
Netherlands 7486.10 0.11 Liberia 2126.33 0.62 
Thailand 6476.31 0.20 Nicaragua 4808.68 0.36 
Singapore 7962.14 0.06 Sierre Leone 3093.03 0.53 
UAE 6873.76 0.17 Uganda 2421.92 0.59 
All 7336.24 0.12 (.313) All 2685.20 0.57 (.09) 
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Private Credit  
Table 15 Observations CU Interaction Net 
PC Data 114,473 .859*** 
(.107) 
[7.99] 
------------------------------------------ .859 
PC12 114,473 .8965*** 
(.111) 
[8.04] 
-.0000922 
(.0000545) 
[-1.69] 
.757 
(.119) 
[6.34] 
PC_HH 42 .855*** 
(.107) 
[7.96] 
-.107 
(.218) 
[-0.49] 
--------- 
PC_HL 51 .921*** 
(.110) 
[8.33] 
-.584* 
(.248) 
[-2.36] 
.337 
(.246) 
[1.37] 
PC_LL 868 .678*** 
(.139) 
[5.11] 
.255* 
(.112) 
[2.28] 
.934 
(.112) 
[8.30] 
All Interactions HH 
42 
HL 
51 
LL 
868 
.759*** 
(.139) 
[5.46] 
HH 
-.154 
(.219) 
[-0.71] 
HL 
-.522* 
(.252) 
[-2.06] 
LL 
.213 
(.113) 
[1.88] 
--------- 
Note—Coefficients with a p-value less than .05 are identified with a *; less than .1 a **; and less than 
.01 with a *** 
The cumulative level of private credit is insignificant under the time-fixed 
effects model.  Trade between partners with low levels of private credit increases the 
currency union effect by 18 percent (only significant at the 5 percent level).  Lastly, for 
trade between a nation with high levels of private credit and a nation with low levels of 
private credit, the currency union effect is 96 percent lower (only significant at the 5 
percent level).  
 Table 16 gives a comparison between the currency union estimates for the 10 
countries with the highest levels of private credit and the 10 countries with the lowest 
levels of private credit.  The time-fixed effects model estimates that the currency union 
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effect will be 58 percent higher for countries with lower financial development; 
however, this result is inconclusive given the wide standard error. 
 
Table 16 PC, Time-Fixed Effects 
Top 10 PC   Bottom 10 PC   
Country Avg Time Effects Country Avg Time Effects 
Japan 4103.99 0.46 Armenia 100.69 0.84 
Cyprus 2666.04 0.60 DRC 15.463 0.85 
Switzerland 3678.27 0.50 Tanzania 135.15 0.84 
Hong Kong 3245.09 0.54 Azerbaijan 48.88 0.85 
Thailand 1324.68 0.73 Ukraine 34.17 0.85 
USA 3430.31 0.52 Uganda 91.00 0.84 
Sweden 2587.33 0.60 Angola 51.36 0.85 
United Kingdom 3992.91 0.47 Ghana 85.48 0.84 
South Africa 2077.29 0.65 Syria 215.14 0.83 
Germany 3530.04 0.51 Haiti 360.03 0.82 
All 3063.59 0.56 (.31) All 113.74 0.84 (.01) 
 
Liquid Liabilities 
Table 17 Observations CU Interaction Net 
LL Data 115,020 .901*** 
(.109) 
[8.25] 
------------------------------------ .901 
LL12 115,020 .9128*** 
(.122) 
[7.46] 
-.0000227 
(.0000641) 
[-0.35] 
--------- 
LL_HH 85 .902*** 
(.109) 
[8.26] 
-.249 
(.175) 
[-1.42] 
--------- 
LL_HL 96 .972*** 
(.115) 
[8.44] 
-.433* 
(.219) 
[-1.97] 
.539 
(.21) 
[2.53] 
LL_LL 971 .777*** 
(.160) 
[4.85] 
-.169 
(.161) 
[1.05] 
--------- 
All Interactions HH 
85 
HL 
96 
LL 
971 
.952*** 
(.182) 
[5.22] 
HH 
-.307 
(.178) 
[-1.72] 
HL 
-.465 
(.239) 
[-1.94] 
LL 
.036 
(.173) 
[0.21] 
--------- 
Note—Coefficients with a p-value less than .05 are identified with a *; less than .1 a **; and less than 
.01 with a *** 
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Under the time-fixed effects model, levels of liquid liabilities have no 
significant effect on the currency union effect on trade with one exception:  trade is 
predicted to fall by 74 percent for partners where one nation has high financial 
development and the other has low financial development (only significant at the 5 
percent level). 
Table 18 gives the currency union estimates under the time-fixed effects model 
for the 10 countries with the highest level of liquid liabilities and the 10 countries with 
the lowest levels of liquid liabilities.  Consistent with theory, the currency union effect 
for the 10 countries with the lowest level of liquid liability is predicted to be 20 percent 
higher than the 10 most financially developed economies.  These results are 
inconclusive given the wide standard error. 
Table 18 LL, Time-Fixed Effects 
Top 10 LL   Bottom 10 LL   
Country Avg Time Effects Country Avg Time Effects 
Japan 5728.11 0.77 Armenia 202.73 0.89 
Malta 5482.29 0.77 Guinnea-Bissau 271.46 0.89 
Hong Kong 5380.13 0.77 Bhutan 261.79 0.89 
Switzerland 4850.04 0.79 Gabon 486.81 0.88 
Cyprus 3533.46 0.82 DRC 148.91 0.89 
Malaysia 2942.73 0.83 El Salvador 313.24 0.89 
Singapore 3152.43 0.82 Costa Rica 1253.67 0.87 
Portugal 2946.63 0.83 Uganda 312.20 0.89 
Austria 3032.06 0.83 Tanzania 512.41 0.88 
United Kingdom 3361.93 0.82 Bolivia 968.24 0.87 
All 4040.98 0.80 (.51) All 473.15 0.89 (.06) 
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Time-Fixed and Entity-Fixed Effects 
A combined time-fixed effects and entity-fixed effects is used to remove the 
effects of trade partner specific characteristics and variation across time.  An initial 
regression, excluding financial development indicators, predicts a currency union effect 
that will increase trade by 80 percent.13 
Commercial Bank Assets 
Table 19 Observations CU Interaction Net 
CCB Data 105,119 .292*** 
(.08) 
[3.39] 
---------------------------------------- .292 
CCB12 105,119 .78*** 
(.13) 
[5.74] 
-.0001*** 
(.00001) 
[-5.54] 
.14 
(.08) 
[1.72] 
CCB_HH 130 .310*** 
(.086) 
[3.59] 
-.454*** 
(.127) 
[-3.57] 
-.144 
(.148) 
[-0.97] 
CCB_HL 40 .300*** 
(.086) 
[3.48] 
-.341 
(.306) 
[-1.59] 
--------------- 
CCB_LL 497 .180* 
(.09) 
[1.99] 
.284*** 
(.078) 
[3.63] 
.464 
(.45) 
[4.68] 
All 
Interactions 
HH 
130 
HL 
40 
LL 
497 
.219* 
(.091) 
[2.39] 
HH 
-.433*** 
(.128) 
[-3.37] 
HL 
-.325 
(.215) 
[-1.51] 
LL 
.244*** 
(.079) 
[3.07] 
-------------- 
Note—Coefficients with a p-value less than .05 are identified with a *; less than .1 a **; and less than 
.01 with a *** 
 The results of the time-fixed and entity-fixed effects model reflect those of the 
fixed-effects model.  The cumulative level of commercial to central bank assets reduces 
the currency union effect by 19 percent at the mean level of financial development.  
This implies a lower currency union effect for nations with higher ratios of commercial 
                                                          
13 Using 219,558 observations with 99% confidence 
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to central bank assets.  Specifically, when two trade partners have high ratios of 
commercial to central bank assets, the currency union effect falls by 47 percent.  For 
countries with low levels of financial development, the currency union effect is 26 
percent higher.  The effect of financial development on the currency union effect is 
insignificant under this model for trade between an economy with high financial 
development and an economy with low financial development. 
 Table 20 compares the estimates of the currency union effects under the 
combined time-fixed and entity-fixed effects model for the 10 countries with the highest 
commercial bank assets to the 10 countries with the lowest levels of commercial bank 
assets.  The findings suggest the currency union effect increases trade by less than 1 
percent for the 10 most financially developed economies (e.009= 1.009).  In contrast, the 
currency union effect on trade increases by 64 percent (e.49= 1.64) for countries with 
the 10 lowest levels of commercial bank assets. 
Table 20 CCB, Time-Fixed Effects and Entity-Fixed Effects 
Top 10 CCB   Bottom 10 CCB   
Country Avg 
Time and 
Entity Country Avg 
Time and 
Entity 
Austria 7525.76 -0.01 Afghanistan 887.11 0.68 
Bahamas 7382.45 0.00 Angola 2584.23 0.50 
France 7417.97 0.00 Bolivia 3607.23 0.40 
Germany 7459.49 -0.00 Burma 2624.33 0.50 
Ireland 7208.96 0.02 Cape Verde 2307.76 0.53 
Kuwait 7569.49 -0.01 Haiti 2391.40 0.52 
Netherlands 7486.10 -0.00 Liberia 2126.33 0.55 
Thailand 6476.31 0.09 Nicaragua 4808.68 0.27 
Singapore 7962.14 -0.05 Sierre Leone 3093.03 0.45 
UAE 6873.76 0.05 Uganda 2421.92 0.52 
All 7336.24 0.01 (.14) All 2685.20 .49 (.05) 
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Private Credit 
Table 21 Observations CU Interaction Net 
PC Data 117,897 .87*** 
(.11) 
[7.31] 
-------------------------------------- .87 
PC12 117,897 .921*** 
(.12) 
[7.49] 
-.00009 
(.00005) 
[-1.76] 
.773 
(.13) 
[5.91] 
PC_HH 42 .871*** 
(.119) 
[7.31] 
-.101 
(.217) 
[-0.47] 
--------- 
PC_HL 51 .945*** 
(.123) 
[7.65] 
-.554* 
(.249) 
[-2.22] 
.391 
(.248) 
[1.57] 
PC_LL 868 .698*** 
(.142) 
[4.9] 
.254* 
(.113) 
[2.24] 
.952 
(.12) 
[7.65] 
All 
Interactions 
HH 
42 
HL 
51 
LL 
868 
.783*** 
(.150) 
[5.22] 
HH 
-.142 
(.218) 
[-0.65] 
HL 
-.485 
(.255) 
[-1.90] 
LL 
.219 
(.115) 
[1.90] 
---------- 
Note—Coefficients with a p-value less than .05 are identified with a *; less than .1 a **; and less than 
.01 with a *** 
The model shows that accounting for cumulative levels of private credit lowers 
the currency union effect by 22 percent.  This reduction is greater for trade partners 
with higher levels of cumulative private credit.  There is no significant effect found for 
levels of private credit on the currency union effect for trade between partners with high 
levels of financial development.  For trade between one economy with high levels of 
private credit and one economy with low levels of private credit, the currency union 
effect decreases by 90 percent.  The currency union effect is 21 percent higher for trade 
between economies with low levels of private credit. 
 Table 22 gives the currency union estimates for the 10 countries with the highest 
levels of private credit and the 10 countries with the lowest levels of private credit.  The 
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findings suggest that the currency union effect for the 10 countries with the lowest 
levels of private credit will be 59 percent higher than the average effect for the 10 
countries with the highest levels of private credit. 
Table 22 PC, Time-Fixed Effects and Entity-Fixed Effects 
Top 10 PC   Bottom 10 PC   
Country Avg 
Time and 
Entity Country Avg 
Time and 
Entity 
Japan 4103.99 0.55 Armenia 100.69 0.91 
Cyprus 2666.04 0.68 DRC 15.46 0.91 
Switzerland 3678.27 0.58 Tanzania 135.15 0.90 
Hong Kong 3245.09 0.62 Azerbaijan 48.88 0.91 
Thailand 1324.68 0.80 Ukraine 34.17 0.91 
USA 3430.31 0.61 Uganda 91.00 0.91 
Sweden 2587.33 0.68 Angola 51.36 0.91 
United Kingdom 3992.91 0.56 Ghana 85.48 0.91 
South Africa 2077.29 0.73 Syria 215.14 0.90 
Germany 3530.04 0.60 Haiti 360.03 0.88 
All 3063.59 0.64 (.30) All  113.74 .91 (.01) 
 
Liquid Liabilities 
Table 23 Observations CU Interaction Net 
LL Data 118,381 .92*** 
(.12) 
[7.62] 
------------------------------------ .92 
LL12 118,381 .96*** 
(.13) 
[7.13] 
-.00004 
(.000068) 
[-.68] 
-------------- 
LL_HH 85 .928*** 
(.121) 
[7.62] 
-.194 
(.17) 
[-1.10] 
-------------- 
LL_HL 96 1.024*** 
(.129) 
[7.89] 
-.478* 
(.223) 
[-2.14] 
-------------- 
LL_LL 971 .776*** 
(.169) 
[4.58] 
.214 
(.166) 
[1.29] 
-------------- 
All 
Interactions 
HH 
85 
HL 
96 
LL 
971 
.962*** 
(.194) 
[4.95] 
HH 
-.250 
(.178) 
[-1.40] 
HL 
-.475* 
(.242) 
[-1.96] 
LL 
.086 
(.178) 
[0.48] 
-------------- 
Note—Coefficients with a p-value less than .05 are identified with a *; less than .1 a **; and less than 
.01 with a *** 
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Under the time-fixed and entity-fixed effects model, levels of liquid liabilities 
appear to have no significant impact on the currency union effect. 
Table 24 compares the estimate of the currency union effect under the combined 
time-fixed and entity-fixed effects model for the 10 countries with the highest levels of 
liquid liabilities and the 10 countries with the lowest liquid liabilities.  The currency 
union effect for the 10 countries with the lowest level of liquid liabilities is found to be 
35 percent higher than for the countries with the 10 highest levels of liquid liabilities.  
This result are inconclusive given the wide standard error. 
Table 24 LL, Time-Fixed Effects and Entity-Fixed Effects 
Top 10 LL   Bottom 10 LL   
Country Avg 
Time and 
Entity Country  Avg 
Time and 
Entity 
Japan 5728.11 0.730875327 Armenia 202.73 0.95 
Malta 5482.29 0.74 Guinnea-Bissau 271.46 0.94 
Hong Kong 5380.13 0.74 Bhutan 261.79 0.94 
Switzerland 4850.04 0.76 Gabon 486.81 0.94 
Cyprus 3533.46 0.81 DRC 148.91 0.95 
Malaysia 2942.73 0.84 El Salvador 313.24 0.94 
Singapore 3152.43 0.83 Costa Rica 1253.67 0.90 
Portugal 2946.63 0.84 Uganda 312.20 0.94 
Austria 3032.06 0.83 Tanzania 512.41 0.93 
United Kingdom 3361.93 0.82 Bolivia 968.24 0.92 
All 4040.98 .79 (.87) All 4040.98 0.94 (.10) 
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Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 Using observations of bilateral trade from 1960 to 1997 taken from the Glick 
and Rose (2001) gravity model and over 219,558 observations of financial 
development, the paper tests whether the strength of the currency union effect on trade 
varies across levels of financial development.  Evidence suggests that there is a negative 
relationship between financial development and the strength of the currency union 
effect.  That is, countries with low levels of financial development experience a higher 
gain in trade from currency union formation than countries with high levels of financial 
development.  This claim is supported by most measures of commercial bank assets 
and private credit.  These findings imply that the efficiency of financial institutions may 
play an important role in determining the impact of currency union formation on trade.  
Measures of liquid liabilities are mostly insignificant implying that the size of a 
country’s financial sector has very little impact on the currency union effect on trade.  
 As the first, formal attempt to measure the relationship between financial 
development and the currency union effect on trade, this paper sets a benchmark for 
further testing.  The findings add to previous theories of the role of financial 
development on the effect of exchange rate volatility on trade by supporting what many 
have theorized: economies with lower levels of financial development are more 
adversely affected by exchange rate volatility than economies with better developed 
financial systems.  
This research should encourage policymakers in economies with low levels of 
financial development to consider the trade benefits of joining a currency union.  The 
evidence suggests that a currency union will increase trade significantly, especially if 
it is with another economy with low financial development. 
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 For economies with well-developed financial systems, the decision to join a 
currency union should be taken with great consideration.  The findings of this paper 
suggest that the currency union effect on trade for these nations will still be positive, 
but only marginally so.  Considering the significant loss of power and seignorage 
associated with abandoning national currencies, some nations may even be negatively 
affected by currency union formation.  
Two contradictions result from this study.  First, the pooled OLS model predicts 
a higher currency union effect for trade partners that have high levels of financial 
development.  This paper argues that the pooled OLS regression fails to account for 
country-pair and time effects captured in subsequent models.  Second, there is 
consistently a large, negative impact on the currency union effect when one trade 
partner has low levels of financial development and the other has high levels of 
financial development.  This paper argues that this is the result of a lack of data as well 
as country-specific circumstances.  For instance, in the case of the ratio of commercial 
to central bank assets, all 40 observations that have a trade partner with high financial 
development joining a currency union with a nation with low financial development 
come from former French colonies in Africa using the CFA Franc.  For private credit 
observations involving one partner with high financial development joining a currency 
union with a nation with low financial development, 50 out of the 51 observations come 
from Latin American nations adopting the U.S. Dollar.  Similarly, for observations of 
liquid liabilities where a currency union exists between a partner with high financial 
development and a partner with low financial development, 91 out of the 96 
observations come from Latin American trade with the United States.  These findings 
suggest that there may be specific circumstances and policies acting against the 
currency union effect on trade in these observations. 
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The research is limited by the timeline of available data as many significant 
developments in currency unions occurred from 1996 to present.  Additionally, data 
from the Eurozone, as the most studied currency union in recent literature, would add 
to the strength of the current research.  Furthermore, some research suggests that the 
effect of currency unions has fallen in recent years because of technological 
advancements in international finance and currency exchange (De Sousa 2011).  Recent 
evidence on the currency union effect also points to the importance of historical events 
in the effectiveness of currency unions, arguing that currency unions themselves may 
have very little effect on trade (Campbell 2012). 
Further research on this topic may benefit from more recent data to understand 
the effect of the Eurozone.  Also, to further clarify the findings of this paper, a dataset 
with country-level trade data rather than bilateral trade data may better capture the 
effect of financial development for both countries rather than relying on findings based 
on paired trade data.   
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Appendix 
Table 1A 
Pooled OLS Regressions for All Commercial-Central Bank Assets Data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade 
              
Custrict 1.430*** 0.919*** 1.374*** 1.458*** 1.324*** 1.295*** 
 (27.70) (5.67) (25.91) (28.01) (22.55) (20.92) 
       
landl 
-
0.212*** -0.219*** -0.217*** 
-
0.238*** 
-
0.220*** -0.245*** 
 (-17.44) (-18.20) (-17.88) (-19.50) (-18.19) (-20.05) 
       
island 0.00893 -0.0101 0.00895 0.0215 0.00258 0.0119 
 (0.70) (-0.80) (0.71) (1.69) (0.20) (0.94) 
       
border 0.341*** 0.325*** 0.334*** 0.355*** 0.369*** 0.369*** 
 (9.46) (9.08) (9.28) (9.88) (10.29) (10.28) 
       
comlang 0.365*** 0.382*** 0.367*** 0.375*** 0.385*** 0.393*** 
 (25.26) (26.66) (25.42) (26.00) (26.73) (27.31) 
       
comcol 0.239*** 0.233*** 0.236*** 0.228*** 0.238*** 0.227*** 
 (10.95) (10.74) (10.83) (10.46) (10.94) (10.46) 
       
comctry 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
       
colony 1.298*** 1.274*** 1.296*** 1.276*** 1.266*** 1.252*** 
 (25.42) (25.13) (25.40) (25.03) (24.91) (24.65) 
       
curcol 2.941*** 2.630*** 2.878*** 2.995*** 2.921*** 2.883*** 
 (4.43) (3.99) (4.34) (4.52) (4.42) (4.37) 
       
regional 0.896*** 0.876*** 0.889*** 0.910*** 0.885*** 0.890*** 
 (19.50) (19.11) (19.34) (19.83) (19.32) (19.43) 
       
lareap -0.00368 0.0103*** -0.00118 0.00188 0.00250 0.00891** 
 (-1.25) (3.52) (-0.40) (0.64) (0.86) (3.01) 
       
ldist 
-
1.255*** -1.267*** -1.254*** 
-
1.261*** 
-
1.274*** -1.276*** 
 (-150.52) (-152.86) (-150.44) (-151.28) (-153.14) (-153.40) 
       
lrgdp 0.864*** 0.856*** 0.862*** 0.859*** 0.864*** 0.858*** 
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 (251.47) (250.61) (250.31) (249.54) (252.54) (249.31) 
       
lrgdppc 0.571*** 0.478*** 0.566*** 0.573*** 0.516*** 0.514*** 
 (108.27) (84.92) (106.13) (108.60) (94.17) (92.91) 
       
ccb12  0.000128***     
  (45.35)     
       
cuccb12  0.0000365     
  (1.59)     
       
ccb_HH   0.185***   0.227*** 
   (7.21)   (8.78) 
       
cu_ccb_HH   0.662***   0.526** 
   (3.41)   (2.69) 
       
ccb_HL    0.261***  0.179*** 
    (18.26)  (12.19) 
       
cu_ccb_HL    -0.0941  -0.113 
    (-0.28)  (-0.34) 
       
ccb_LL     
-
0.596*** -0.551*** 
     (-35.74) (-32.29) 
       
cu_ccb_LL     0.0894 0.111 
     (0.82) (1.00) 
       
_cons 
-
30.53*** -29.70*** -30.43*** 
-
30.45*** 
-
29.54*** -29.43*** 
 (-244.17) (-236.44) (-241.70) (-243.62) (-231.47) (-229.28) 
       
N 145389 145389 145389 145389 145389 145389 
              
t statistics in 
parentheses * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 
 *** 
p<0.001    
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Table 2A 
Fixed Effects Regression for All Commercial-Central Bank Assets Data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade 
              
custrict 0.328*** 0.904*** 0.347*** 0.335*** 0.187* 0.224* 
 (3.78) (6.57) (3.99) (3.85) (2.05) (2.43) 
       
landl 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
island 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
border 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
comlang 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
comcol 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
comctry 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
colony 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
       
curcol 0.105 -0.193 0.0465 0.104 0.103 0.0375 
 (0.23) (-0.42) (0.10) (0.22) (0.22) (0.08) 
       
regional 0.440*** 0.433*** 0.431*** 0.440*** 0.439*** 0.430*** 
 (7.78) (7.68) (7.62) (7.78) (7.75) (7.61) 
       
lareap 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
ldist 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
       
lrgdp 0.0289* 0.143*** 0.0302* 0.0284* 0.0452*** 0.0489*** 
 (2.25) (10.70) (2.35) (2.21) (3.48) (3.73) 
       
lrgdppc 0.896*** 0.673*** 0.886*** 0.897*** 0.858*** 0.845*** 
 (42.94) (30.62) (42.20) (42.88) (40.40) (39.46) 
       
ccb12  0.000104***     
  (35.61)     
       
cuccb12  
-
0.000119***     
  (-6.44)     
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ccb_HH   0.136***   0.136*** 
   (6.87)   (6.86) 
       
cu_ccb_HH   -0.497***   -0.459*** 
   (-3.87)   (-3.54) 
       
ccb_HL    -0.00198  -0.0131 
    (-0.17)  (-1.14) 
       
cu_ccb_HL    -0.307  -0.272 
    (-1.42)  (-1.26) 
       
ccb_LL     -0.202*** -0.204*** 
     (-14.79) (-14.88) 
       
cu_ccb_LL     0.365*** 0.322*** 
     (4.62) (4.02) 
       
_cons 
-
5.931*** -8.455*** -5.838*** 
-
5.923*** -6.075*** -6.047*** 
 (-17.58) (-24.40) (-17.29) (-17.42) (-17.89) (-17.64) 
       
N 145389 145389 145389 145389 145389 145389 
              
t statistics in 
parentheses * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 
 *** 
p<0.001    
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Table 3A 
Time-Fixed Effects Regression for All Commercial-Central Bank Assets Data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade 
              
custrict 0.374*** 0.830*** 0.390*** 0.387*** 0.266** 0.305*** 
 (4.61) (6.20) (4.79) (4.76) (3.10) (3.51) 
       
landl 
-
0.296*** -0.319*** -0.299*** 
-
0.297*** -0.294*** 
-
0.297*** 
 (-7.03) (-7.61) (-7.11) (-7.06) (-7.01) (-7.11) 
       
island 0.175*** 0.181*** 0.180*** 0.176*** 0.175*** 0.182*** 
 (3.40) (3.54) (3.50) (3.44) (3.43) (3.57) 
       
border 0.425** 0.394* 0.416** 0.427** 0.430** 0.422** 
 (2.66) (2.49) (2.61) (2.69) (2.71) (2.67) 
       
comlang 0.317*** 0.344*** 0.319*** 0.318*** 0.325*** 0.327*** 
 (5.21) (5.69) (5.24) (5.23) (5.37) (5.42) 
       
comcol 0.140 0.124 0.137 0.140 0.142 0.140 
 (1.74) (1.55) (1.72) (1.76) (1.79) (1.76) 
       
comctry 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
       
colony 1.754*** 1.741*** 1.754*** 1.750*** 1.738*** 1.736*** 
 (6.76) (6.76) (6.77) (6.77) (6.75) (6.75) 
       
curcol -0.0903 -0.304 -0.152 -0.0735 -0.0788 -0.132 
 (-0.20) (-0.66) (-0.33) (-0.16) (-0.17) (-0.29) 
       
regional 0.717*** 0.693*** 0.710*** 0.719*** 0.715*** 0.709*** 
 (13.02) (12.63) (12.89) (13.06) (12.98) (12.88) 
       
lareap -0.0184 -0.0193 -0.0182 -0.0181 -0.0192 -0.0187 
 (-1.67) (-1.76) (-1.66) (-1.65) (-1.75) (-1.71) 
       
ldist 
-
1.458*** -1.472*** -1.458*** 
-
1.458*** -1.465*** 
-
1.466*** 
 (-46.58) (-47.36) (-46.64) (-46.73) (-47.13) (-47.26) 
       
lrgdp 0.886*** 0.900*** 0.888*** 0.886*** 0.891*** 0.893*** 
 (73.50) (75.04) (73.69) (73.68) (74.24) (74.54) 
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lrgdppc 0.360*** 0.245*** 0.349*** 0.361*** 0.335*** 0.323*** 
 (23.99) (15.96) (23.13) (24.09) (22.19) (21.35) 
       
1960b.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
1961.year -0.156** -0.154** -0.157** -0.158** -0.154** -0.158** 
 (-2.97) (-2.95) (-2.99) (-3.02) (-2.95) (-3.01) 
1962.year 
-
0.220*** -0.220*** -0.220*** 
-
0.222*** -0.225*** 
-
0.227*** 
 (-4.25) (-4.27) (-4.25) (-4.29) (-4.34) (-4.38) 
1963.year 
-
0.265*** -0.269*** -0.266*** 
-
0.269*** -0.265*** 
-
0.269*** 
 (-5.27) (-5.37) (-5.29) (-5.35) (-5.26) (-5.34) 
1964.year 
-
0.259*** -0.255*** -0.259*** 
-
0.263*** -0.259*** 
-
0.261*** 
 (-5.29) (-5.21) (-5.28) (-5.35) (-5.29) (-5.33) 
1965.year 
-
0.357*** -0.352*** -0.355*** 
-
0.358*** -0.367*** 
-
0.366*** 
 (-7.35) (-7.29) (-7.31) (-7.37) (-7.56) (-7.54) 
1966.year 
-
0.352*** -0.360*** -0.350*** 
-
0.352*** -0.364*** 
-
0.363*** 
 (-7.48) (-7.69) (-7.45) (-7.50) (-7.75) (-7.73) 
1967.year 
-
0.442*** -0.455*** -0.442*** 
-
0.444*** -0.455*** 
-
0.455*** 
 (-9.41) (-9.72) (-9.39) (-9.44) (-9.68) (-9.68) 
1968.year 
-
0.583*** -0.600*** -0.583*** 
-
0.586*** -0.593*** 
-
0.595*** 
 (-12.35) (-12.75) (-12.35) (-12.40) (-12.56) (-12.60) 
1969.year 
-
0.880*** -0.890*** -0.880*** 
-
0.883*** -0.894*** 
-
0.896*** 
 (-19.09) (-19.40) (-19.10) (-19.15) (-19.41) (-19.45) 
1970.year 
-
0.945*** -0.961*** -0.945*** 
-
0.949*** -0.963*** 
-
0.965*** 
 (-20.55) (-20.97) (-20.55) (-20.62) (-20.95) (-20.99) 
1971.year 
-
1.008*** -1.025*** -1.008*** 
-
1.013*** -1.022*** 
-
1.025*** 
 (-21.92) (-22.37) (-21.92) (-22.02) (-22.22) (-22.29) 
1972.year 
-
0.998*** -1.025*** -1.000*** 
-
1.002*** -1.025*** 
-
1.030*** 
 (-21.65) (-22.31) (-21.69) (-21.72) (-22.23) (-22.33) 
1973.year 
-
0.864*** -0.893*** -0.866*** 
-
0.867*** -0.887*** 
-
0.892*** 
 (-18.97) (-19.68) (-19.02) (-19.04) (-19.48) (-19.59) 
1974.year 
-
0.695*** -0.724*** -0.697*** 
-
0.699*** -0.716*** 
-
0.721*** 
 (-15.27) (-15.96) (-15.32) (-15.36) (-15.74) (-15.85) 
1975.year 
-
0.764*** -0.771*** -0.763*** 
-
0.768*** -0.781*** 
-
0.781*** 
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 (-16.79) (-16.99) (-16.76) (-16.87) (-17.16) (-17.17) 
1976.year 
-
0.857*** -0.849*** -0.853*** 
-
0.860*** -0.869*** 
-
0.866*** 
 (-18.87) (-18.78) (-18.78) (-18.93) (-19.14) (-19.08) 
1977.year 
-
0.840*** -0.828*** -0.837*** 
-
0.844*** -0.848*** 
-
0.848*** 
 (-18.39) (-18.21) (-18.33) (-18.47) (-18.58) (-18.58) 
1978.year 
-
0.911*** -0.878*** -0.905*** 
-
0.914*** -0.915*** 
-
0.911*** 
 (-19.85) (-19.21) (-19.73) (-19.92) (-19.96) (-19.87) 
1979.year 
-
0.926*** -0.890*** -0.920*** 
-
0.929*** -0.932*** 
-
0.928*** 
 (-20.17) (-19.45) (-20.03) (-20.24) (-20.32) (-20.22) 
1980.year 
-
0.987*** -0.930*** -0.982*** 
-
0.991*** -0.994*** 
-
0.991*** 
 (-21.55) (-20.37) (-21.43) (-21.63) (-21.72) (-21.64) 
1981.year 
-
1.102*** -1.027*** -1.097*** 
-
1.106*** -1.106*** 
-
1.103*** 
 (-24.04) (-22.48) (-23.93) (-24.13) (-24.16) (-24.09) 
1982.year 
-
1.266*** -1.182*** -1.260*** 
-
1.270*** -1.269*** 
-
1.265*** 
 (-27.68) (-25.90) (-27.55) (-27.76) (-27.76) (-27.67) 
1983.year 
-
1.403*** -1.295*** -1.397*** 
-
1.407*** -1.403*** 
-
1.399*** 
 (-30.61) (-28.30) (-30.49) (-30.69) (-30.64) (-30.56) 
1984.year 
-
1.450*** -1.340*** -1.445*** 
-
1.455*** -1.445*** 
-
1.443*** 
 (-31.48) (-29.14) (-31.39) (-31.58) (-31.40) (-31.36) 
1985.year 
-
1.534*** -1.428*** -1.529*** 
-
1.539*** -1.534*** 
-
1.532*** 
 (-33.31) (-31.06) (-33.22) (-33.41) (-33.34) (-33.30) 
1986.year 
-
1.582*** -1.477*** -1.577*** 
-
1.587*** -1.578*** 
-
1.577*** 
 (-34.29) (-32.07) (-34.20) (-34.40) (-34.26) (-34.22) 
1987.year 
-
1.614*** -1.517*** -1.609*** 
-
1.619*** -1.610*** 
-
1.608*** 
 (-34.81) (-32.80) (-34.71) (-34.92) (-34.77) (-34.73) 
1988.year 
-
1.590*** -1.495*** -1.586*** 
-
1.596*** -1.589*** 
-
1.589*** 
 (-34.25) (-32.27) (-34.18) (-34.38) (-34.27) (-34.26) 
1989.year 
-
1.628*** -1.542*** -1.625*** 
-
1.634*** -1.628*** 
-
1.630*** 
 (-35.04) (-33.28) (-34.99) (-35.17) (-35.09) (-35.12) 
1990.year 
-
1.637*** -1.555*** -1.637*** 
-
1.646*** -1.635*** 
-
1.640*** 
 (-35.11) (-33.44) (-35.12) (-35.27) (-35.10) (-35.19) 
1991.year 
-
1.640*** -1.557*** -1.640*** 
-
1.648*** -1.639*** 
-
1.643*** 
 (-35.10) (-33.42) (-35.10) (-35.25) (-35.11) (-35.19) 
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1992.year 
-
1.611*** -1.530*** -1.614*** 
-
1.620*** -1.612*** 
-
1.621*** 
 (-34.46) (-32.81) (-34.54) (-34.62) (-34.53) (-34.69) 
1993.year 
-
1.753*** -1.671*** -1.754*** 
-
1.762*** -1.751*** 
-
1.758*** 
 (-37.55) (-35.88) (-37.58) (-37.71) (-37.54) (-37.65) 
1994.year 
-
1.674*** -1.602*** -1.675*** 
-
1.682*** -1.676*** 
-
1.683*** 
 (-35.77) (-34.33) (-35.81) (-35.92) (-35.85) (-35.97) 
1995.year 
-
1.623*** -1.562*** -1.626*** 
-
1.632*** -1.626*** 
-
1.635*** 
 (-34.46) (-33.26) (-34.54) (-34.62) (-34.56) (-34.72) 
1996.year 
-
1.611*** -1.560*** -1.616*** 
-
1.619*** -1.620*** 
-
1.631*** 
 (-33.99) (-33.03) (-34.11) (-34.15) (-34.22) (-34.43) 
1997.year 
-
1.598*** -1.567*** -1.607*** 
-
1.608*** -1.610*** 
-
1.626*** 
 (-33.56) (-33.03) (-33.75) (-33.72) (-33.85) (-34.13) 
       
ccb12  0.0000976***     
  (33.63)     
       
cuccb12  
-
0.0000959***     
  (-5.29)     
       
ccb_HH   0.152***   0.162*** 
   (7.77)   (8.22) 
       
cu_ccb_HH   -0.417**   -0.408** 
   (-3.27)   (-3.16) 
       
ccb_HL    0.0338**  0.0239* 
    (2.98)  (2.08) 
       
cu_ccb_HL    -0.391  -0.383 
    (-1.82)  (-1.78) 
       
ccb_LL     -0.217*** 
-
0.215*** 
     (-16.05) (-15.81) 
       
cu_ccb_LL     0.281*** 0.246** 
     (3.59) (3.10) 
       
_cons 
-
25.26*** -24.63*** -25.19*** 
-
25.28*** -24.97*** 
-
24.91*** 
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 (-62.97) (-61.74) (-62.85) (-63.19) (-62.53) (-62.50) 
       
N 145389 145389 145389 145389 145389 145389 
              
t statistics in 
parentheses * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 
 *** 
p<0.001    
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Table 4A 
Time-Fixed and Entity-Fixed Effects Regression for All Commercial-Central Bank Assets 
Data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade 
              
custrict 
0.292**
* 0.786*** 0.310*** 
0.301**
* 0.181* 0.220* 
 (3.39) (5.74) (3.59) (3.48) (1.99) (2.39) 
       
landl 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
island 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
border 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
comlang 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
comcol 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
comctry 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
colony 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
       
curcol 0.0350 -0.192 -0.0199 0.0403 0.0404 -0.0159 
 (0.08) (-0.42) (-0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (-0.03) 
       
regional 
0.550**
* 0.545*** 0.546*** 
0.551**
* 
0.551**
* 
0.548**
* 
 (9.67) (9.60) (9.59) (9.68) (9.69) (9.62) 
       
lareap 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
ldist 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
       
lrgdp 
0.407**
* 0.492*** 0.416*** 
0.406**
* 
0.425**
* 
0.437**
* 
 (14.60) (17.55) (14.90) (14.58) (15.21) (15.56) 
       
lrgdppc 
0.611**
* 0.421*** 0.593*** 
0.612**
* 
0.575**
* 
0.555**
* 
 (22.24) (14.88) (21.38) (22.26) (20.69) (19.80) 
       
1960b.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
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1961.year -0.120* -0.121* -0.121* -0.121* -0.120* -0.122* 
 (-2.30) (-2.32) (-2.32) (-2.32) (-2.29) (-2.33) 
1962.year 
-
0.146** -0.149** -0.146** 
-
0.147** 
-
0.151** 
-
0.152** 
 (-2.82) (-2.90) (-2.83) (-2.84) (-2.92) (-2.95) 
1963.year 
-
0.161** -0.170*** -0.163** 
-
0.163** 
-
0.162** 
-
0.164** 
 (-3.20) (-3.39) (-3.23) (-3.23) (-3.22) (-3.27) 
1964.year -0.116* -0.119* -0.116* -0.118* -0.118* -0.119* 
 (-2.36) (-2.42) (-2.37) (-2.39) (-2.40) (-2.42) 
1965.year 
-
0.180**
* -0.185*** 
-
0.180*** 
-
0.180**
* 
-
0.191**
* 
-
0.192**
* 
 (-3.68) (-3.80) (-3.68) (-3.69) (-3.92) (-3.93) 
1966.year 
-
0.164**
* -0.181*** 
-
0.164*** 
-
0.165**
* 
-
0.178**
* 
-
0.178**
* 
 (-3.46) (-3.84) (-3.46) (-3.47) (-3.75) (-3.76) 
1967.year 
-
0.223**
* -0.247*** 
-
0.223*** 
-
0.223**
* 
-
0.236**
* 
-
0.238**
* 
 (-4.67) (-5.19) (-4.69) (-4.68) (-4.96) (-4.99) 
1968.year 
-
0.329**
* -0.359*** 
-
0.331*** 
-
0.330**
* 
-
0.341**
* 
-
0.344**
* 
 (-6.84) (-7.49) (-6.87) (-6.85) (-7.10) (-7.14) 
1969.year 
-
0.585**
* -0.612*** 
-
0.588*** 
-
0.586**
* 
-
0.602**
* 
-
0.605**
* 
 (-12.37) (-12.97) (-12.42) (-12.39) (-12.72) (-12.79) 
1970.year 
-
0.610**
* -0.644*** 
-
0.613*** 
-
0.612**
* 
-
0.631**
* 
-
0.634**
* 
 (-12.82) (-13.56) (-12.87) (-12.85) (-13.25) (-13.32) 
1971.year 
-
0.646**
* -0.681*** 
-
0.648*** 
-
0.648**
* 
-
0.663**
* 
-
0.666**
* 
 (-13.46) (-14.25) (-13.51) (-13.50) (-13.82) (-13.89) 
1972.year 
-
0.610**
* -0.656*** 
-
0.614*** 
-
0.611**
* 
-
0.639**
* 
-
0.644**
* 
 (-12.62) (-13.62) (-12.71) (-12.65) (-13.22) (-13.33) 
1973.year 
-
0.445**
* -0.496*** 
-
0.450*** 
-
0.447**
* 
-
0.472**
* 
-
0.478**
* 
 (-9.26) (-10.34) (-9.36) (-9.28) (-9.80) (-9.92) 
1974.year 
-
0.241**
* -0.293*** 
-
0.246*** 
-
0.242**
* 
-
0.265**
* 
-
0.272**
* 
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 (-4.95) (-6.06) (-5.06) (-4.98) (-5.46) (-5.60) 
1975.year 
-
0.293**
* -0.326*** 
-
0.295*** 
-
0.294**
* 
-
0.314**
* 
-
0.318**
* 
 (-5.98) (-6.69) (-6.03) (-6.01) (-6.42) (-6.50) 
1976.year 
-
0.354**
* -0.376*** 
-
0.355*** 
-
0.355**
* 
-
0.372**
* 
-
0.373**
* 
 (-7.19) (-7.66) (-7.20) (-7.20) (-7.55) (-7.57) 
1977.year 
-
0.304**
* -0.325*** 
-
0.307*** 
-
0.306**
* 
-
0.319**
* 
-
0.323**
* 
 (-6.08) (-6.52) (-6.13) (-6.11) (-6.39) (-6.46) 
1978.year 
-
0.348**
* -0.351*** 
-
0.348*** 
-
0.349**
* 
-
0.361**
* 
-
0.362**
* 
 (-6.86) (-6.94) (-6.87) (-6.88) (-7.12) (-7.13) 
1979.year 
-
0.333**
* -0.334*** 
-
0.333*** 
-
0.334**
* 
-
0.348**
* 
-
0.349**
* 
 (-6.49) (-6.54) (-6.49) (-6.52) (-6.79) (-6.81) 
1980.year 
-
0.370**
* -0.354*** 
-
0.371*** 
-
0.372**
* 
-
0.386**
* 
-
0.388**
* 
 (-7.15) (-6.86) (-7.17) (-7.18) (-7.46) (-7.51) 
1981.year 
-
0.461**
* -0.430*** 
-
0.463*** 
-
0.463**
* 
-
0.476**
* 
-
0.478**
* 
 (-8.85) (-8.28) (-8.87) (-8.87) (-9.13) (-9.17) 
1982.year 
-
0.613**
* -0.576*** 
-
0.614*** 
-
0.615**
* 
-
0.627**
* 
-
0.629**
* 
 (-11.69) (-11.02) (-11.72) (-11.72) (-11.96) (-12.00) 
1983.year 
-
0.734**
* -0.677*** 
-
0.736*** 
-
0.735**
* 
-
0.746**
* 
-
0.749**
* 
 (-13.88) (-12.83) (-13.91) (-13.90) (-14.11) (-14.15) 
1984.year 
-
0.761**
* -0.705*** 
-
0.764*** 
-
0.763**
* 
-
0.769**
* 
-
0.774**
* 
 (-14.22) (-13.21) (-14.28) (-14.25) (-14.38) (-14.45) 
1985.year 
-
0.824**
* -0.773*** 
-
0.827*** 
-
0.825**
* 
-
0.836**
* 
-
0.840**
* 
 (-15.25) (-14.35) (-15.31) (-15.28) (-15.49) (-15.57) 
1986.year 
-
0.845**
* -0.798*** 
-
0.849*** 
-
0.847**
* 
-
0.856**
* 
-
0.860**
* 
 (-15.48) (-14.66) (-15.54) (-15.51) (-15.68) (-15.76) 
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1987.year 
-
0.843**
* -0.805*** 
-
0.846*** 
-
0.845**
* 
-
0.853**
* 
-
0.858**
* 
 (-15.22) (-14.59) (-15.28) (-15.25) (-15.41) (-15.50) 
1988.year 
-
0.799**
* -0.765*** 
-
0.803*** 
-
0.801**
* 
-
0.812**
* 
-
0.818**
* 
 (-14.27) (-13.71) (-14.35) (-14.30) (-14.51) (-14.62) 
1989.year 
-
0.806**
* -0.784*** 
-
0.812*** 
-
0.808**
* 
-
0.821**
* 
-
0.829**
* 
 (-14.21) (-13.88) (-14.32) (-14.25) (-14.49) (-14.62) 
1990.year 
-
0.797**
* -0.781*** 
-
0.806*** 
-
0.800**
* 
-
0.810**
* 
-
0.821**
* 
 (-13.92) (-13.68) (-14.06) (-13.95) (-14.15) (-14.31) 
1991.year 
-
0.789**
* -0.773*** 
-
0.797*** 
-
0.791**
* 
-
0.803**
* 
-
0.813**
* 
 (-13.64) (-13.42) (-13.78) (-13.67) (-13.89) (-14.05) 
1992.year 
-
0.737**
* -0.726*** 
-
0.748*** 
-
0.740**
* 
-
0.754**
* 
-
0.767**
* 
 (-12.60) (-12.46) (-12.79) (-12.64) (-12.90) (-13.11) 
1993.year 
-
0.865**
* -0.854*** 
-
0.875*** 
-
0.868**
* 
-
0.879**
* 
-
0.891**
* 
 (-14.67) (-14.54) (-14.83) (-14.71) (-14.92) (-15.10) 
1994.year 
-
0.768**
* -0.769*** 
-
0.779*** 
-
0.771**
* 
-
0.787**
* 
-
0.799**
* 
 (-12.90) (-12.96) (-13.06) (-12.93) (-13.21) (-13.40) 
1995.year 
-
0.685**
* -0.698*** 
-
0.697*** 
-
0.688**
* 
-
0.705**
* 
-
0.719**
* 
 (-11.30) (-11.56) (-11.49) (-11.34) (-11.63) (-11.84) 
1996.year 
-
0.651**
* -0.677*** 
-
0.665*** 
-
0.654**
* 
-
0.677**
* 
-
0.694**
* 
 (-10.61) (-11.07) (-10.83) (-10.64) (-11.04) (-11.28) 
1997.year 
-
0.639**
* -0.687*** 
-
0.657*** 
-
0.643**
* 
-
0.669**
* 
-
0.689**
* 
 (-10.30) (-11.10) (-10.57) (-10.34) (-10.77) (-11.06) 
       
ccb12  
0.0000952**
*     
  (31.76)     
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cuccb12  
-
0.000101***     
  (-5.54)     
       
ccb_HH   0.129***   
0.135**
* 
   (6.50)   (6.76) 
       
cu_ccb_HH   
-
0.454***   
-
0.433**
* 
   (-3.57)   (-3.37) 
       
ccb_HL    0.0109  0.00221 
    (0.95)  (0.19) 
       
cu_ccb_HL    -0.341  -0.326 
    (-1.59)  (-1.51) 
       
ccb_LL     
-
0.189**
* 
-
0.191**
* 
     (-13.86) (-13.87) 
       
cu_ccb_LL     
0.285**
* 0.245** 
     (3.63) (3.07) 
       
_cons 
-
18.89**
* -20.51*** 
-
19.08*** 
-
18.89**
* 
-
19.16**
* 
-
19.39**
* 
 (-20.02) (-21.73) (-20.18) (-20.01) (-20.28) (-20.49) 
       
N 145389 145389 145389 145389 145389 145389 
              
t statistics in 
parentheses 
* 
p<0.05  ** p<0.01 
 *** 
p<0.001    
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Table 5A 
Pooled OLS Regression for All Private Credit Data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade 
              
custrict 1.777*** 1.816*** 1.787*** 1.816*** 1.790*** 2.036*** 
 (29.53) (25.43) (29.27) (29.61) (18.39) (18.84) 
       
landl -0.285*** -0.313*** -0.289*** -0.338*** -0.316*** -0.359*** 
 (-21.38) (-23.38) (-21.63) (-25.21) (-23.68) (-26.65) 
       
island 0.0500*** 0.0307* 0.0494*** 0.0585*** 0.0658*** 0.0645*** 
 (3.77) (2.31) (3.72) (4.42) (4.97) (4.87) 
       
border 0.472*** 0.446*** 0.464*** 0.516*** 0.526*** 0.536*** 
 (10.85) (10.25) (10.66) (11.89) (12.09) (12.33) 
       
comlang 0.427*** 0.432*** 0.428*** 0.457*** 0.455*** 0.473*** 
 (27.27) (27.64) (27.33) (29.20) (29.07) (30.25) 
       
comcol 0.246*** 0.224*** 0.240*** 0.236*** 0.240*** 0.224*** 
 (10.52) (9.56) (10.28) (10.15) (10.29) (9.63) 
       
comctry 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
       
colony 1.219*** 1.205*** 1.219*** 1.099*** 1.147*** 1.071*** 
 (22.81) (22.59) (22.82) (20.58) (21.51) (20.07) 
       
curcol 1.720** 1.489** 1.681** 1.966*** 1.878*** 1.945*** 
 (3.13) (2.72) (3.06) (3.59) (3.43) (3.56) 
       
regional 0.348*** 0.371*** 0.351*** 0.378*** 0.340*** 0.353*** 
 (6.74) (7.15) (6.78) (7.34) (6.55) (6.80) 
       
lareap -0.0539*** -0.0439*** -0.0526*** -0.0496*** 
-
0.0399*** 
-
0.0379*** 
 (-17.61) (-14.11) (-17.12) (-16.23) (-12.87) (-12.23) 
       
ldist -1.256*** -1.247*** -1.252*** -1.272*** -1.263*** -1.265*** 
 (-137.51) (-136.47) (-136.78) (-139.45) (-138.55) (-138.65) 
       
lrgdp 0.903*** 0.882*** 0.899*** 0.890*** 0.890*** 0.875*** 
 (238.67) (223.63) (234.41) (234.16) (234.24) (225.47) 
       
lrgdppc 0.612*** 0.576*** 0.606*** 0.605*** 0.560*** 0.557*** 
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 (104.36) (93.10) (101.22) (103.24) (90.63) (88.68) 
       
pc12  0.0000651***     
  (18.18)     
       
cupc12  -0.000127**     
  (-2.65)     
       
pc_HH   0.145***   0.330*** 
   (5.38)   (11.79) 
       
cupc_HH   -0.631   -1.067** 
   (-1.91)   (-3.15) 
       
pc_HL    0.378***  0.329*** 
    (27.85)  (21.24) 
       
cupc_HL    -0.912**  -1.108*** 
    (-3.12)  (-3.64) 
       
pc_LL     -0.418*** -0.266*** 
     (-26.70) (-15.45) 
       
cupc_LL     -0.0460 -0.329** 
     (-0.39) (-2.58) 
       
_cons -31.89*** -30.72*** -31.69*** -31.23*** -30.59*** -30.04*** 
 (-228.24) (-199.54) (-219.11) (-220.85) (-207.18) (-196.12) 
       
N 114473 114473 114473 114473 114473 114473 
              
t statistics in 
parentheses * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001    
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Table 6A 
Fixed Effects Regression for All Private Credit Data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade 
              
custrict 0.936*** 0.985*** 0.935*** 1.006*** 0.789*** 0.872*** 
 (7.79) (7.96) (7.78) (8.09) (5.50) (5.78) 
       
landl 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
island 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
border 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
comlang 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
comcol 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
comctry 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
colony 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
       
curcol 0.0828 0.110 0.0789 0.0781 0.0788 0.0740 
 (0.18) (0.24) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) 
       
regional 0.468*** 0.465*** 0.460*** 0.467*** 0.466*** 0.460*** 
 (7.74) (7.69) (7.62) (7.73) (7.72) (7.61) 
       
lareap 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
       
ldist 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
       
lrgdp 0.149*** 0.139*** 0.149*** 0.151*** 0.154*** 0.153*** 
 (9.75) (9.06) (9.75) (9.83) (9.76) (9.69) 
       
lrgdppc 0.723*** 0.698*** 0.711*** 0.720*** 0.719*** 0.707*** 
 (29.82) (28.52) (29.17) (29.61) (29.39) (28.75) 
       
pc12  0.0000282***     
  (7.78)     
       
cupc12  -0.0000944     
  (-1.69)     
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pc_HH   0.109***   0.107*** 
   (4.78)   (4.61) 
       
cupc_HH   0.0147   -0.0238 
   (0.07)   (-0.11) 
       
pc_HL    -0.0167  -0.00638 
    (-1.34)  (-0.50) 
       
cupc_HL    -0.532*  -0.464 
    (-2.12)  (-1.80) 
       
pc_LL     0.0177 0.0139 
     (1.22) (0.95) 
       
cupc_LL     0.217 0.182 
     (1.91) (1.57) 
       
_cons 
-
8.915*** -8.063*** -8.725*** 
-
9.001*** 
-
9.093*** 
-
8.897*** 
 (-22.02) (-19.22) (-21.45) (-21.89) (-21.22) (-20.44) 
       
N 114473 114473 114473 114473 114473 114473 
              
t statistics in 
parentheses * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 
 *** 
p<0.001"    
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Table 7A 
Time-Fixed Effects Regression for All Private Credit Data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade 
              
custrict 0.859*** 0.897*** 0.856*** 0.922*** 0.678*** 0.759*** 
 (7.99) (8.04) (7.96) (8.33) (5.11) (5.46) 
       
landl -0.391*** -0.400*** -0.395*** -0.390*** -0.389*** -0.393*** 
 (-8.96) (-9.22) (-9.04) (-9.01) (-9.00) (-9.15) 
       
island 0.00821 0.00576 0.0104 0.00823 0.00587 0.00783 
 (0.16) (0.11) (0.20) (0.16) (0.11) (0.15) 
       
border 0.435** 0.409* 0.427* 0.435** 0.437** 0.431** 
 (2.62) (2.48) (2.57) (2.64) (2.66) (2.64) 
       
comlang 0.353*** 0.350*** 0.354*** 0.352*** 0.352*** 0.352*** 
 (5.48) (5.46) (5.49) (5.51) (5.53) (5.56) 
       
comcol 0.148 0.128 0.142 0.147 0.155 0.148 
 (1.76) (1.53) (1.69) (1.77) (1.87) (1.79) 
       
comctry 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
       
colony 1.808*** 1.768*** 1.801*** 1.802*** 1.795*** 1.782*** 
 (8.97) (8.84) (8.94) (9.03) (9.02) (9.01) 
       
curcol -0.0336 -0.0165 -0.0441 -0.0287 -0.0239 -0.0277 
 (-0.08) (-0.04) (-0.10) (-0.06) (-0.05) (-0.06) 
       
regional 0.675*** 0.684*** 0.667*** 0.678*** 0.675*** 0.671*** 
 (11.55) (11.71) (11.42) (11.60) (11.56) (11.48) 
       
lareap 
-
0.0746*** -0.0774*** -0.0762*** 
-
0.0748*** 
-
0.0723*** 
-
0.0736*** 
 (-6.86) (-7.17) (-7.01) (-6.94) (-6.71) (-6.87) 
       
ldist -1.414*** -1.411*** -1.411*** -1.413*** -1.416*** -1.412*** 
 (-43.77) (-43.97) (-43.70) (-44.14) (-44.33) (-44.46) 
       
lrgdp 0.917*** 0.920*** 0.919*** 0.918*** 0.915*** 0.916*** 
 (72.69) (73.37) (72.86) (73.16) (73.04) (73.41) 
       
lrgdppc 0.325*** 0.272*** 0.309*** 0.327*** 0.327*** 0.311*** 
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 (19.84) (16.31) (18.74) (20.06) (20.10) (19.06) 
       
1961b.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
1962.year -0.0548 -0.0515 -0.0536 -0.0558 -0.0536 -0.0536 
 (-0.93) (-0.87) (-0.91) (-0.94) (-0.91) (-0.91) 
1963.year -0.0707 -0.0666 -0.0691 -0.0720 -0.0697 -0.0694 
 (-1.20) (-1.13) (-1.18) (-1.22) (-1.18) (-1.18) 
1964.year -0.139* -0.135* -0.136* -0.141* -0.138* -0.137* 
 (-2.42) (-2.34) (-2.37) (-2.45) (-2.39) (-2.38) 
1965.year -0.222*** -0.222*** -0.220*** -0.225*** -0.224*** -0.225*** 
 (-3.95) (-3.94) (-3.91) (-3.99) (-3.98) (-4.00) 
1966.year -0.247*** -0.245*** -0.248*** -0.252*** -0.248*** -0.254*** 
 (-4.52) (-4.48) (-4.52) (-4.59) (-4.52) (-4.63) 
1967.year -0.340*** -0.338*** -0.339*** -0.344*** -0.339*** -0.344*** 
 (-6.23) (-6.20) (-6.23) (-6.30) (-6.21) (-6.30) 
1968.year -0.475*** -0.471*** -0.474*** -0.480*** -0.476*** -0.480*** 
 (-8.70) (-8.64) (-8.68) (-8.77) (-8.72) (-8.78) 
1969.year -0.745*** -0.744*** -0.744*** -0.750*** -0.748*** -0.752*** 
 (-14.07) (-14.06) (-14.05) (-14.14) (-14.11) (-14.17) 
1970.year -0.827*** -0.828*** -0.826*** -0.833*** -0.829*** -0.834*** 
 (-15.84) (-15.86) (-15.82) (-15.92) (-15.86) (-15.93) 
1971.year -0.927*** -0.930*** -0.925*** -0.933*** -0.933*** -0.936*** 
 (-17.94) (-18.00) (-17.90) (-18.02) (-18.04) (-18.09) 
1972.year -0.890*** -0.894*** -0.888*** -0.896*** -0.897*** -0.900*** 
 (-17.20) (-17.28) (-17.15) (-17.29) (-17.33) (-17.37) 
1973.year -0.797*** -0.799*** -0.795*** -0.803*** -0.803*** -0.807*** 
 (-15.43) (-15.48) (-15.40) (-15.54) (-15.54) (-15.61) 
1974.year -0.628*** -0.626*** -0.625*** -0.635*** -0.634*** -0.639*** 
 (-12.21) (-12.17) (-12.16) (-12.32) (-12.33) (-12.40) 
1975.year -0.656*** -0.658*** -0.653*** -0.663*** -0.664*** -0.668*** 
 (-12.82) (-12.88) (-12.77) (-12.94) (-12.98) (-13.04) 
1976.year -0.742*** -0.741*** -0.738*** -0.750*** -0.749*** -0.752*** 
 (-14.45) (-14.44) (-14.38) (-14.57) (-14.57) (-14.61) 
1977.year -0.720*** -0.717*** -0.715*** -0.727*** -0.728*** -0.730*** 
 (-14.04) (-14.01) (-13.95) (-14.17) (-14.20) (-14.22) 
1978.year -0.826*** -0.825*** -0.819*** -0.832*** -0.836*** -0.836*** 
 (-16.00) (-15.99) (-15.88) (-16.12) (-16.19) (-16.18) 
1979.year -0.830*** -0.830*** -0.825*** -0.838*** -0.841*** -0.842*** 
 (-16.10) (-16.11) (-15.99) (-16.23) (-16.29) (-16.30) 
1980.year -0.863*** -0.865*** -0.855*** -0.869*** -0.874*** -0.872*** 
 (-16.80) (-16.86) (-16.64) (-16.92) (-17.01) (-16.96) 
1981.year -0.971*** -0.980*** -0.965*** -0.978*** -0.984*** -0.984*** 
 (-19.00) (-19.21) (-18.90) (-19.13) (-19.24) (-19.25) 
1982.year -1.126*** -1.147*** -1.122*** -1.133*** -1.140*** -1.143*** 
 (-22.04) (-22.47) (-21.97) (-22.16) (-22.28) (-22.33) 
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1983.year -1.241*** -1.267*** -1.240*** -1.249*** -1.256*** -1.262*** 
 (-24.27) (-24.78) (-24.25) (-24.40) (-24.53) (-24.63) 
1984.year -1.328*** -1.352*** -1.327*** -1.336*** -1.343*** -1.350*** 
 (-26.00) (-26.50) (-25.99) (-26.13) (-26.27) (-26.39) 
1985.year -1.401*** -1.426*** -1.402*** -1.409*** -1.415*** -1.424*** 
 (-27.42) (-27.94) (-27.45) (-27.56) (-27.67) (-27.84) 
1986.year -1.443*** -1.470*** -1.445*** -1.452*** -1.459*** -1.469*** 
 (-28.18) (-28.73) (-28.22) (-28.32) (-28.45) (-28.63) 
1987.year -1.467*** -1.494*** -1.468*** -1.475*** -1.482*** -1.492*** 
 (-28.63) (-29.18) (-28.66) (-28.77) (-28.90) (-29.08) 
1988.year -1.430*** -1.460*** -1.429*** -1.439*** -1.447*** -1.453*** 
 (-28.02) (-28.62) (-28.00) (-28.17) (-28.31) (-28.43) 
1989.year -1.454*** -1.489*** -1.455*** -1.463*** -1.471*** -1.480*** 
 (-28.45) (-29.15) (-28.47) (-28.61) (-28.75) (-28.91) 
1990.year -1.469*** -1.506*** -1.471*** -1.479*** -1.485*** -1.496*** 
 (-28.66) (-29.38) (-28.69) (-28.81) (-28.94) (-29.14) 
1991.year -1.452*** -1.492*** -1.452*** -1.461*** -1.469*** -1.477*** 
 (-28.31) (-29.09) (-28.31) (-28.46) (-28.60) (-28.75) 
1992.year -1.454*** -1.498*** -1.458*** -1.464*** -1.470*** -1.484*** 
 (-28.39) (-29.23) (-28.47) (-28.55) (-28.68) (-28.92) 
1993.year -1.572*** -1.618*** -1.579*** -1.582*** -1.587*** -1.605*** 
 (-30.61) (-31.50) (-30.76) (-30.77) (-30.90) (-31.20) 
1994.year -1.522*** -1.568*** -1.529*** -1.532*** -1.538*** -1.556*** 
 (-29.70) (-30.59) (-29.84) (-29.86) (-30.00) (-30.31) 
1995.year -1.473*** -1.518*** -1.481*** -1.484*** -1.490*** -1.508*** 
 (-28.54) (-29.40) (-28.70) (-28.71) (-28.85) (-29.17) 
1996.year -1.478*** -1.529*** -1.485*** -1.489*** -1.495*** -1.511*** 
 (-28.57) (-29.53) (-28.70) (-28.75) (-28.89) (-29.18) 
1997.year -1.485*** -1.544*** -1.495*** -1.496*** -1.502*** -1.522*** 
 (-28.50) (-29.59) (-28.68) (-28.67) (-28.81) (-29.16) 
       
pc12  0.0000546***     
  (15.24)     
       
cupc12  -0.0000922     
  (-1.69)     
       
pc_HH   0.166***   0.178*** 
   (7.35)   (7.76) 
       
cupc_HH   -0.107   -0.155 
   (-0.49)   (-0.71) 
       
pc_HL    0.0152  0.0237 
    (1.24)  (1.87) 
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cupc_HL    -0.585*  -0.523* 
    (-2.36)  (-2.06) 
       
pc_LL     
-
0.0570*** 
-
0.0580*** 
     (-4.03) (-4.04) 
       
cupc_LL     0.256* 0.214 
     (2.28) (1.88) 
       
_cons -25.17*** -24.47*** -24.99*** -25.22*** -25.11*** -24.92*** 
 (-58.44) (-56.79) (-57.97) (-58.93) (-58.71) (-58.36) 
       
N 114473 114473 114473 114473 114473 114473 
              
t statistics in 
parentheses * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001    
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Table 8A 
Time-Fixed and Entity-Fixed Effects Regression for All Private Credit Data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade 
              
custrict 0.873*** 0.922*** 0.872*** 0.945*** 0.698*** 0.784*** 
 (7.31) (7.49) (7.31) (7.65) (4.90) (5.22) 
       
landl 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
island 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
border 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
comlang 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
comcol 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
comctry 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
colony 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
       
curcol 0.0840 0.0977 0.0728 0.0788 0.0845 0.0729 
 (0.19) (0.22) (0.16) (0.17) (0.19) (0.16) 
       
regional 0.548*** 0.574*** 0.548*** 0.548*** 0.547*** 0.547*** 
 (9.01) (9.44) (9.00) (9.01) (8.98) (8.98) 
       
lareap 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
ldist 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
       
lrgdp 0.428*** 0.498*** 0.451*** 0.431*** 0.428*** 0.451*** 
 (12.98) (14.85) (13.59) (13.04) (12.90) (13.48) 
       
lrgdppc 0.510*** 0.405*** 0.475*** 0.507*** 0.510*** 0.475*** 
 (16.02) (12.25) (14.72) (15.90) (15.91) (14.63) 
       
1961b.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
1962.year -0.0196 -0.0184 -0.0189 -0.0191 -0.0195 -0.0187 
 (-0.33) (-0.31) (-0.32) (-0.32) (-0.33) (-0.32) 
1963.year -0.00130 -0.00228 -0.00111 -0.00111 -0.00137 -0.00117 
 (-0.02) (-0.04) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.02) 
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1964.year -0.0216 -0.0256 -0.0214 -0.0212 -0.0217 -0.0214 
 (-0.38) (-0.44) (-0.37) (-0.37) (-0.38) (-0.37) 
1965.year -0.0723 -0.0810 -0.0732 -0.0716 -0.0726 -0.0735 
 (-1.28) (-1.44) (-1.30) (-1.27) (-1.29) (-1.30) 
1966.year -0.0867 -0.0954 -0.0897 -0.0842 -0.0866 -0.0893 
 (-1.58) (-1.73) (-1.63) (-1.53) (-1.58) (-1.62) 
1967.year -0.147** -0.159** -0.151** -0.145** -0.147** -0.150** 
 (-2.68) (-2.90) (-2.75) (-2.64) (-2.67) (-2.73) 
1968.year -0.240*** -0.253*** -0.243*** 
-
0.238*** 
-
0.239*** 
-
0.242*** 
 (-4.34) (-4.58) (-4.40) (-4.30) (-4.33) (-4.38) 
1969.year -0.463*** -0.481*** -0.467*** 
-
0.462*** 
-
0.464*** 
-
0.467*** 
 (-8.58) (-8.90) (-8.65) (-8.55) (-8.58) (-8.65) 
1970.year -0.502*** -0.523*** -0.506*** 
-
0.500*** 
-
0.502*** 
-
0.506*** 
 (-9.34) (-9.74) (-9.43) (-9.31) (-9.34) (-9.42) 
1971.year -0.566*** -0.591*** -0.571*** 
-
0.565*** 
-
0.566*** 
-
0.571*** 
 (-10.58) (-11.05) (-10.67) (-10.56) (-10.59) (-10.68) 
1972.year -0.506*** -0.534*** -0.511*** 
-
0.506*** 
-
0.507*** 
-
0.512*** 
 (-9.40) (-9.91) (-9.49) (-9.38) (-9.41) (-9.50) 
1973.year -0.372*** -0.401*** -0.378*** 
-
0.371*** 
-
0.373*** 
-
0.379*** 
 (-6.86) (-7.39) (-6.97) (-6.84) (-6.87) (-6.98) 
1974.year -0.160** -0.188*** -0.166** -0.159** -0.160** -0.167** 
 (-2.93) (-3.44) (-3.04) (-2.91) (-2.93) (-3.05) 
1975.year -0.171** -0.205*** -0.177** -0.170** -0.171** -0.178** 
 (-3.12) (-3.74) (-3.25) (-3.11) (-3.12) (-3.25) 
1976.year -0.217*** -0.252*** -0.224*** 
-
0.217*** 
-
0.218*** 
-
0.225*** 
 (-3.92) (-4.54) (-4.04) (-3.91) (-3.93) (-4.05) 
1977.year -0.162** -0.197*** -0.168** -0.161** -0.162** -0.169** 
 (-2.89) (-3.53) (-3.01) (-2.89) (-2.89) (-3.01) 
1978.year -0.237*** -0.276*** -0.243*** 
-
0.237*** 
-
0.236*** 
-
0.243*** 
 (-4.16) (-4.85) (-4.27) (-4.17) (-4.15) (-4.27) 
1979.year -0.205*** -0.247*** -0.212*** 
-
0.205*** 
-
0.204*** 
-
0.213*** 
 (-3.56) (-4.30) (-3.69) (-3.57) (-3.56) (-3.70) 
1980.year -0.214*** -0.261*** -0.220*** 
-
0.215*** 
-
0.214*** 
-
0.221*** 
 (-3.70) (-4.51) (-3.81) (-3.72) (-3.69) (-3.82) 
1981.year -0.301*** -0.357*** -0.310*** 
-
0.302*** 
-
0.301*** 
-
0.311*** 
 (-5.19) (-6.12) (-5.34) (-5.20) (-5.18) (-5.35) 
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1982.year -0.443*** -0.510*** -0.455*** 
-
0.444*** 
-
0.443*** 
-
0.456*** 
 (-7.57) (-8.68) (-7.77) (-7.59) (-7.57) (-7.78) 
1983.year -0.541*** -0.614*** -0.555*** 
-
0.542*** 
-
0.541*** 
-
0.556*** 
 (-9.15) (-10.33) (-9.39) (-9.16) (-9.15) (-9.40) 
1984.year -0.603*** -0.678*** -0.619*** 
-
0.604*** 
-
0.603*** 
-
0.620*** 
 (-10.12) (-11.31) (-10.37) (-10.13) (-10.12) (-10.39) 
1985.year -0.657*** -0.735*** -0.675*** 
-
0.657*** 
-
0.657*** 
-
0.676*** 
 (-10.91) (-12.14) (-11.20) (-10.91) (-10.92) (-11.21) 
1986.year -0.670*** -0.751*** -0.689*** 
-
0.670*** 
-
0.670*** 
-
0.690*** 
 (-10.99) (-12.25) (-11.29) (-10.99) (-11.00) (-11.31) 
1987.year -0.663*** -0.747*** -0.682*** 
-
0.663*** 
-
0.663*** 
-
0.683*** 
 (-10.74) (-12.03) (-11.04) (-10.75) (-10.75) (-11.06) 
1988.year -0.598*** -0.686*** -0.615*** 
-
0.599*** 
-
0.598*** 
-
0.617*** 
 (-9.61) (-10.95) (-9.89) (-9.63) (-9.62) (-9.91) 
1989.year -0.595*** -0.690*** -0.616*** 
-
0.596*** 
-
0.596*** 
-
0.617*** 
 (-9.45) (-10.87) (-9.76) (-9.46) (-9.45) (-9.78) 
1990.year -0.586*** -0.684*** -0.607*** 
-
0.586*** 
-
0.586*** 
-
0.608*** 
 (-9.18) (-10.63) (-9.51) (-9.19) (-9.19) (-9.52) 
1991.year -0.560*** -0.663*** -0.581*** 
-
0.561*** 
-
0.560*** 
-
0.582*** 
 (-8.68) (-10.19) (-9.00) (-8.70) (-8.69) (-9.02) 
1992.year -0.540*** -0.649*** -0.566*** 
-
0.541*** 
-
0.541*** 
-
0.567*** 
 (-8.32) (-9.89) (-8.69) (-8.32) (-8.32) (-8.71) 
1993.year -0.634*** -0.747*** -0.663*** 
-
0.634*** 
-
0.635*** 
-
0.665*** 
 (-9.63) (-11.22) (-10.04) (-9.63) (-9.64) (-10.06) 
1994.year -0.567*** -0.682*** -0.596*** 
-
0.567*** 
-
0.568*** 
-
0.598*** 
 (-8.52) (-10.15) (-8.95) (-8.53) (-8.54) (-8.97) 
1995.year -0.479*** -0.596*** -0.510*** 
-
0.479*** 
-
0.480*** 
-
0.511*** 
 (-7.06) (-8.69) (-7.50) (-7.06) (-7.08) (-7.52) 
1996.year -0.462*** -0.585*** -0.492*** 
-
0.462*** 
-
0.463*** 
-
0.494*** 
 (-6.73) (-8.44) (-7.16) (-6.74) (-6.75) (-7.18) 
1997.year -0.458*** -0.591*** -0.492*** 
-
0.458*** 
-
0.459*** 
-
0.493*** 
 (-6.58) (-8.37) (-7.04) (-6.58) (-6.59) (-7.06) 
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pc12  0.0000433***     
  (11.59)     
       
cupc12  -0.0000978     
  (-1.76)     
       
pc_HH   0.146***   0.145*** 
   (6.32)   (6.23) 
       
cupc_HH   -0.102   -0.143 
   (-0.47)   (-0.65) 
       
pc_HL    -0.0146  -0.00287 
    (-1.17)  (-0.22) 
       
cupc_HL    -0.555*  -0.486 
    (-2.22)  (-1.90) 
       
pc_LL     -0.00238 -0.00576 
     (-0.16) (-0.39) 
       
cupc_LL     0.254* 0.219 
     (2.24) (1.90) 
       
_cons -18.45*** -20.10*** -18.97*** 
-
18.57*** 
-
18.46*** 
-
18.97*** 
 (-16.39) (-17.72) (-16.81) (-16.44) (-16.28) (-16.66) 
       
N 114473 114473 114473 114473 114473 114473 
              
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001    
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Table 9A 
Pooled OLS Regressions for All Liquid Liabilities Data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade 
              
custrict 1.805*** 1.856*** 1.836*** 1.876*** 1.549*** 1.922*** 
 (29.95) (24.66) (29.62) (29.89) (13.76) (11.99) 
       
landl -0.280*** -0.296*** -0.278*** -0.314*** -0.315*** -0.330*** 
 (-20.95) (-21.97) (-20.82) (-23.44) (-23.44) (-24.47) 
       
island 0.0546*** 0.0385** 0.0569*** 0.0625*** 0.0525*** 0.0590*** 
 (4.13) (2.88) (4.30) (4.74) (3.98) (4.47) 
       
border 0.411*** 0.405*** 0.409*** 0.433*** 0.451*** 0.451*** 
 (9.61) (9.45) (9.56) (10.14) (10.52) (10.54) 
       
comlang 0.414*** 0.412*** 0.415*** 0.435*** 0.423*** 0.436*** 
 (26.55) (26.45) (26.62) (27.88) (27.19) (27.95) 
       
comcol 0.214*** 0.196*** 0.215*** 0.203*** 0.183*** 0.185*** 
 (9.12) (8.32) (9.14) (8.64) (7.79) (7.86) 
       
comctry 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
       
colony 1.176*** 1.184*** 1.178*** 1.070*** 1.126*** 1.059*** 
 (23.35) (23.51) (23.37) (21.18) (22.35) (20.97) 
       
curcol 1.897*** 1.847** 1.909*** 2.079*** 1.957*** 2.073*** 
 (3.36) (3.27) (3.38) (3.69) (3.47) (3.68) 
       
regional 0.377*** 0.412*** 0.397*** 0.410*** 0.413*** 0.428*** 
 (7.38) (7.87) (7.68) (8.04) (7.98) (8.19) 
       
lareap -0.0580*** -0.0493*** -0.0600*** -0.0500*** -0.0452*** -0.0427*** 
 (-19.09) (-15.38) (-19.39) (-16.35) (-14.52) (-13.48) 
       
ldist -1.254*** -1.249*** -1.256*** -1.267*** -1.257*** -1.265*** 
 (-138.76) (-137.76) (-138.70) (-140.23) (-139.16) (-139.76) 
       
lrgdp 0.912*** 0.901*** 0.914*** 0.902*** 0.897*** 0.893*** 
 (243.30) (228.08) (239.74) (239.05) (234.70) (228.82) 
       
lrgdppc 0.604*** 0.592*** 0.607*** 0.606*** 0.573*** 0.585*** 
 (104.78) (99.92) (104.05) (105.20) (96.06) (96.57) 
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ll12  0.0000292***     
  (8.85)     
       
cull12  -0.0000541     
  (-1.28)     
       
ll_HH   -0.0753**   0.0395 
   (-3.17)   (1.59) 
       
cull_HH   -0.425   -0.635* 
   (-1.82)   (-2.34) 
       
ll_HL    0.294***  0.233*** 
    (22.21)  (15.24) 
       
cull_HL    -0.789***  -0.819** 
    (-3.65)  (-3.13) 
       
ll_LL     -0.306*** -0.190*** 
     (-19.57) (-10.99) 
       
cull_LL     0.402** 0.0220 
     (3.07) (0.13) 
       
_cons -32.12*** -31.70*** -32.20*** -31.83*** -31.09*** -31.20*** 
 (-230.89) (-215.61) (-226.66) (-227.88) (-209.33) (-206.07) 
       
N 115020 115020 115020 115020 115020 115020 
              
t statistics in 
parentheses * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 
 *** 
p<0.001    
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Table 10A 
Fixed Effect Regressions for All Liquid Liabilities Data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade 
              
custrict 0.989*** 1.021*** 0.989*** 1.078*** 0.774*** 0.923*** 
 (8.07) (7.52) (8.07) (8.25) (4.53) (4.72) 
       
landl 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
island 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
border 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
comlang 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
comcol 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
comctry 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
colony 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
       
curcol 0.101 0.100 0.108 0.105 0.102 0.117 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.24) (0.23) (0.22) (0.26) 
       
regional 0.506*** 0.506*** 0.503*** 0.509*** 0.504*** 0.506*** 
 (8.57) (8.56) (8.50) (8.60) (8.53) (8.54) 
       
lareap 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
ldist 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
       
lrgdp 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.201*** 0.220*** 0.218*** 
 (13.59) (13.38) (13.58) (13.32) (14.02) (13.81) 
       
lrgdppc 0.674*** 0.675*** 0.671*** 0.676*** 0.659*** 0.659*** 
 (28.46) (28.39) (28.17) (28.42) (27.42) (27.24) 
       
ll12  
-
0.000000541     
  (-0.13)     
       
cull12  -0.0000374     
  (-0.55)     
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ll_HH   0.0258   0.0312 
   (1.26)   (1.49) 
       
cull_HH   -0.123   -0.172 
   (-0.69)   (-0.95) 
       
ll_HL    0.0145  0.0269* 
    (1.20)  (2.15) 
       
cull_HL    -0.453*  -0.378 
    (-2.02)  (-1.55) 
       
ll_LL     0.0501*** 0.0561*** 
     (3.45) (3.79) 
       
cull_LL     0.309 0.204 
     (1.85) (1.14) 
       
_cons -10.74*** -10.76*** -10.69*** 
-
10.67*** -11.31*** -11.19*** 
 (-26.83) (-25.03) (-26.56) (-26.40) (-26.15) (-25.64) 
       
N 115020 115020 115020 115020 115020 115020 
              
t statistics in 
parentheses * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001    
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Table 11A 
Time-Fixed Effects Regressions for all Liquid Liabilities Data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade 
              
 0.901*** 0.913*** 0.902*** 0.973*** 0.778*** 0.952*** 
custrict (8.25) (7.46) (8.26) (8.44) (4.85) (5.22) 
       
 -0.372*** -0.391*** -0.373*** -0.372*** -0.371*** -0.374*** 
landl (-8.33) (-8.76) (-8.37) (-8.37) (-8.37) (-8.46) 
       
 0.0229 0.0191 0.0247 0.0230 0.0203 0.0222 
island (0.43) (0.36) (0.47) (0.44) (0.39) (0.43) 
       
 0.340* 0.329* 0.334* 0.340* 0.343* 0.339* 
border (2.04) (1.97) (2.00) (2.05) (2.07) (2.05) 
       
 0.370*** 0.366*** 0.368*** 0.370*** 0.369*** 0.366*** 
comlang (5.72) (5.66) (5.69) (5.74) (5.73) (5.71) 
       
 0.108 0.0932 0.104 0.106 0.110 0.104 
comcol (1.27) (1.10) (1.23) (1.26) (1.30) (1.24) 
       
 0 0 0 0 0 0 
comctry (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
       
 1.753*** 1.755*** 1.744*** 1.746*** 1.748*** 1.730*** 
colony (8.77) (8.78) (8.73) (8.77) (8.80) (8.74) 
       
 -0.000874 0.0529 0.0229 0.00485 -0.00272 0.0323 
curcol (-0.00) (0.12) (0.05) (0.01) (-0.01) (0.07) 
       
 0.720*** 0.721*** 0.709*** 0.725*** 0.721*** 0.716*** 
regional (12.57) (12.60) (12.37) (12.65) (12.59) (12.48) 
       
 
-
0.0798*** -0.0728*** -0.0803*** 
-
0.0791*** 
-
0.0782*** 
-
0.0776*** 
lareap (-7.31) (-6.66) (-7.36) (-7.27) (-7.19) (-7.15) 
       
 -1.406*** -1.403*** -1.405*** -1.406*** -1.406*** -1.404*** 
ldist (-42.94) (-42.85) (-42.95) (-43.11) (-43.21) (-43.29) 
       
 0.931*** 0.928*** 0.933*** 0.930*** 0.929*** 0.930*** 
lrgdp (73.52) (73.28) (73.70) (73.62) (73.41) (73.65) 
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 0.304*** 0.276*** 0.293*** 0.306*** 0.305*** 0.296*** 
lrgdppc (18.71) (16.64) (17.89) (18.86) (18.87) (18.13) 
       
1961b.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
1962.year -0.0616 -0.0621 -0.0610 -0.0617 -0.0615 -0.0609 
 (-1.08) (-1.09) (-1.07) (-1.08) (-1.08) (-1.07) 
1963.year -0.0965 -0.0982 -0.0962 -0.0980 -0.0963 -0.0977 
 (-1.71) (-1.75) (-1.71) (-1.74) (-1.71) (-1.73) 
1964.year -0.138* -0.137* -0.138* -0.140* -0.138* -0.140* 
 (-2.49) (-2.47) (-2.49) (-2.52) (-2.48) (-2.52) 
1965.year -0.216*** -0.215*** -0.215*** -0.217*** -0.215*** -0.216*** 
 (-3.98) (-3.96) (-3.96) (-4.00) (-3.97) (-3.98) 
1966.year -0.235*** -0.234*** -0.234*** -0.237*** -0.235*** -0.236*** 
 (-4.49) (-4.45) (-4.47) (-4.52) (-4.49) (-4.50) 
1967.year -0.317*** -0.316*** -0.316*** -0.319*** -0.319*** -0.319*** 
 (-6.12) (-6.08) (-6.09) (-6.15) (-6.14) (-6.15) 
1968.year -0.452*** -0.449*** -0.452*** -0.455*** -0.453*** -0.457*** 
 (-8.69) (-8.64) (-8.70) (-8.74) (-8.71) (-8.79) 
1969.year -0.722*** -0.719*** -0.720*** -0.723*** -0.723*** -0.722*** 
 (-14.38) (-14.33) (-14.34) (-14.40) (-14.39) (-14.38) 
1970.year -0.802*** -0.800*** -0.799*** -0.802*** -0.804*** -0.800*** 
 (-16.19) (-16.15) (-16.14) (-16.18) (-16.23) (-16.13) 
1971.year -0.902*** -0.901*** -0.899*** -0.902*** -0.904*** -0.901*** 
 (-18.40) (-18.40) (-18.34) (-18.40) (-18.44) (-18.37) 
1972.year -0.876*** -0.877*** -0.874*** -0.879*** -0.878*** -0.879*** 
 (-17.89) (-17.91) (-17.86) (-17.94) (-17.93) (-17.93) 
1973.year -0.763*** -0.762*** -0.761*** -0.767*** -0.765*** -0.766*** 
 (-15.60) (-15.57) (-15.56) (-15.66) (-15.62) (-15.65) 
1974.year -0.586*** -0.579*** -0.583*** -0.589*** -0.586*** -0.586*** 
 (-12.01) (-11.87) (-11.95) (-12.06) (-12.02) (-12.01) 
1975.year -0.612*** -0.610*** -0.609*** -0.615*** -0.614*** -0.614*** 
 (-12.58) (-12.54) (-12.52) (-12.65) (-12.62) (-12.62) 
1976.year -0.684*** -0.680*** -0.681*** -0.688*** -0.686*** -0.687*** 
 (-14.00) (-13.92) (-13.94) (-14.07) (-14.04) (-14.04) 
1977.year -0.667*** -0.665*** -0.664*** -0.671*** -0.669*** -0.671*** 
 (-13.64) (-13.60) (-13.58) (-13.72) (-13.69) (-13.71) 
1978.year -0.779*** -0.779*** -0.776*** -0.783*** -0.784*** -0.782*** 
 (-15.86) (-15.84) (-15.78) (-15.92) (-15.94) (-15.91) 
1979.year -0.792*** -0.790*** -0.789*** -0.797*** -0.796*** -0.797*** 
 (-16.12) (-16.08) (-16.06) (-16.21) (-16.19) (-16.21) 
1980.year -0.808*** -0.807*** -0.806*** -0.813*** -0.812*** -0.815*** 
 (-16.48) (-16.45) (-16.44) (-16.58) (-16.55) (-16.61) 
1981.year -0.911*** -0.915*** -0.910*** -0.916*** -0.916*** -0.919*** 
 (-18.66) (-18.73) (-18.62) (-18.75) (-18.75) (-18.80) 
89 
 
1982.year -1.067*** -1.078*** -1.066*** -1.071*** -1.073*** -1.075*** 
 (-21.84) (-22.05) (-21.81) (-21.91) (-21.95) (-21.98) 
1983.year -1.178*** -1.193*** -1.178*** -1.182*** -1.187*** -1.188*** 
 (-24.09) (-24.39) (-24.08) (-24.16) (-24.23) (-24.26) 
1984.year -1.261*** -1.276*** -1.263*** -1.265*** -1.269*** -1.274*** 
 (-25.78) (-26.08) (-25.81) (-25.86) (-25.91) (-26.00) 
1985.year -1.329*** -1.348*** -1.332*** -1.335*** -1.336*** -1.344*** 
 (-27.17) (-27.52) (-27.22) (-27.27) (-27.29) (-27.45) 
1986.year -1.383*** -1.405*** -1.385*** -1.388*** -1.390*** -1.398*** 
 (-28.22) (-28.65) (-28.27) (-28.32) (-28.35) (-28.50) 
1987.year -1.406*** -1.429*** -1.409*** -1.411*** -1.414*** -1.423*** 
 (-28.70) (-29.14) (-28.77) (-28.81) (-28.84) (-29.02) 
1988.year -1.352*** -1.373*** -1.355*** -1.358*** -1.359*** -1.369*** 
 (-27.67) (-28.08) (-27.75) (-27.79) (-27.81) (-28.00) 
1989.year -1.387*** -1.410*** -1.392*** -1.394*** -1.395*** -1.407*** 
 (-28.36) (-28.79) (-28.46) (-28.48) (-28.50) (-28.73) 
1990.year -1.409*** -1.430*** -1.412*** -1.415*** -1.416*** -1.426*** 
 (-28.72) (-29.12) (-28.79) (-28.84) (-28.86) (-29.05) 
1991.year -1.406*** -1.427*** -1.411*** -1.413*** -1.414*** -1.426*** 
 (-28.65) (-29.06) (-28.76) (-28.78) (-28.80) (-29.03) 
       
1992.year -1.404*** -1.429*** -1.410*** -1.410*** -1.413*** -1.425*** 
 (-28.67) (-29.14) (-28.79) (-28.79) (-28.83) (-29.06) 
1993.year -1.505*** -1.531*** -1.512*** -1.512*** -1.515*** -1.527*** 
 (-30.60) (-31.07) (-30.73) (-30.72) (-30.76) (-31.00) 
1994.year -1.464*** -1.488*** -1.470*** -1.470*** -1.473*** -1.486*** 
 (-29.83) (-30.29) (-29.96) (-29.95) (-29.99) (-30.24) 
1995.year -1.413*** -1.437*** -1.419*** -1.420*** -1.422*** -1.434*** 
 (-28.56) (-29.00) (-28.68) (-28.69) (-28.72) (-28.96) 
1996.year -1.416*** -1.441*** -1.421*** -1.422*** -1.425*** -1.435*** 
 (-28.60) (-29.07) (-28.70) (-28.72) (-28.76) (-28.97) 
1997.year -1.423*** -1.453*** -1.428*** -1.429*** -1.432*** -1.443*** 
 (-28.51) (-29.05) (-28.62) (-28.63) (-28.68) (-28.89) 
       
ll12  0.0000339***     
  (8.55)     
       
cull12  -0.0000227     
  (-0.35)     
       
ll_HH   0.102***   0.117*** 
   (5.06)   (5.65) 
       
cull_HH   -0.249   -0.308 
   (-1.42)   (-1.72) 
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ll_HL    0.0272*  0.0357** 
    (2.30)  (2.89) 
       
cull_HL    -0.433*  -0.465 
    (-1.97)  (-1.94) 
       
ll_LL     -0.0319* -0.0267 
     (-2.25) (-1.83) 
       
cull_LL     0.170 0.0362 
     (1.05) (0.21) 
       
_cons -25.50*** -25.13*** -25.42*** -25.53*** -25.46*** -25.39*** 
 (-58.65) (-57.54) (-58.47) (-58.92) (-58.63) (-58.58) 
       
N 115020 115020 115020 115020 115020 115020 
       
t statistics in 
parentheses * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001    
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Table 12A 
Time-Fixed and Entity-Fixed Effects for all Liquid Liabilities Data 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade ltrade 
              
custrict 0.928*** 0.962*** 0.928*** 1.025*** 0.777*** 0.962*** 
 (7.62) (7.13) (7.62) (7.89) (4.58) (4.95) 
landl 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
island 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
border 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
comlang 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
comcol 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
comctry 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
colony 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
curcol 0.106 0.143 0.123 0.106 0.106 0.126 
 (0.23) (0.32) (0.27) (0.24) (0.24) (0.28) 
       
regional 0.599*** 0.605*** 0.595*** 0.600*** 0.598*** 0.596*** 
 (10.06) (10.14) (9.98) (10.07) (10.03) (10.00) 
       
lareap 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
ldist 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
       
lrgdp 0.489*** 0.508*** 0.504*** 0.489*** 0.491*** 0.505*** 
 (15.11) (15.61) (15.45) (15.08) (15.05) (15.35) 
       
lrgdppc 0.454*** 0.416*** 0.432*** 0.453*** 0.452*** 0.431*** 
 (14.53) (13.00) (13.58) (14.46) (14.35) (13.45) 
       
1961b.year 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
1962.year -0.0215 -0.0229 -0.0215 -0.0215 -0.0216 -0.0215 
 (-0.38) (-0.40) (-0.38) (-0.38) (-0.38) (-0.38) 
1963.year -0.0259 -0.0290 -0.0266 -0.0261 -0.0262 -0.0274 
 (-0.46) (-0.52) (-0.47) (-0.46) (-0.47) (-0.49) 
1964.year -0.0259 -0.0280 -0.0271 -0.0259 -0.0261 -0.0280 
 (-0.46) (-0.50) (-0.49) (-0.47) (-0.47) (-0.50) 
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1965.year -0.0729 -0.0757 -0.0738 -0.0729 -0.0733 -0.0745 
 (-1.34) (-1.39) (-1.36) (-1.34) (-1.35) (-1.37) 
1966.year -0.0820 -0.0845 -0.0831 -0.0818 -0.0821 -0.0835 
 (-1.56) (-1.60) (-1.58) (-1.55) (-1.56) (-1.59) 
1967.year -0.138** -0.141** -0.139** -0.137** -0.137** -0.139** 
 (-2.63) (-2.69) (-2.66) (-2.62) (-2.62) (-2.65) 
1968.year -0.232*** -0.235*** -0.235*** -0.231*** -0.231*** -0.235*** 
 (-4.40) (-4.47) (-4.46) (-4.38) (-4.39) (-4.46) 
1969.year -0.461*** -0.466*** -0.463*** -0.460*** -0.461*** -0.462*** 
 (-9.01) (-9.09) (-9.04) (-9.00) (-9.00) (-9.03) 
1970.year -0.500*** -0.506*** -0.502*** -0.499*** -0.500*** -0.500*** 
 (-9.82) (-9.93) (-9.85) (-9.80) (-9.81) (-9.82) 
1971.year -0.567*** -0.575*** -0.569*** -0.567*** -0.567*** -0.568*** 
 (-11.17) (-11.33) (-11.21) (-11.16) (-11.17) (-11.19) 
1972.year -0.521*** -0.530*** -0.524*** -0.521*** -0.521*** -0.524*** 
 (-10.23) (-10.41) (-10.29) (-10.22) (-10.23) (-10.29) 
1973.year -0.370*** -0.379*** -0.374*** -0.370*** -0.370*** -0.374*** 
 (-7.20) (-7.37) (-7.27) (-7.20) (-7.20) (-7.28) 
1974.year -0.150** -0.156** -0.153** -0.150** -0.151** -0.154** 
 (-2.90) (-3.02) (-2.96) (-2.89) (-2.91) (-2.96) 
1975.year -0.160** -0.170** -0.163** -0.159** -0.160** -0.164** 
 (-3.08) (-3.26) (-3.14) (-3.07) (-3.08) (-3.15) 
1976.year -0.195*** -0.205*** -0.199*** -0.195*** -0.196*** -0.200*** 
 (-3.70) (-3.88) (-3.77) (-3.69) (-3.70) (-3.78) 
1977.year -0.146** -0.158** -0.151** -0.146** -0.146** -0.151** 
 (-2.74) (-2.96) (-2.82) (-2.73) (-2.74) (-2.83) 
1978.year -0.227*** -0.241*** -0.231*** -0.226*** -0.227*** -0.231*** 
 (-4.18) (-4.43) (-4.26) (-4.16) (-4.18) (-4.25) 
1979.year -0.205*** -0.219*** -0.211*** -0.205*** -0.206*** -0.211*** 
 (-3.74) (-3.99) (-3.84) (-3.73) (-3.74) (-3.84) 
1980.year -0.201*** -0.216*** -0.208*** -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.209*** 
 (-3.64) (-3.90) (-3.76) (-3.63) (-3.64) (-3.77) 
1981.year -0.285*** -0.304*** -0.293*** -0.285*** -0.285*** -0.293*** 
 (-5.12) (-5.45) (-5.25) (-5.11) (-5.12) (-5.25) 
       
1982.year -0.429*** -0.454*** -0.438*** -0.429*** -0.429*** -0.437*** 
 (-7.65) (-8.06) (-7.79) (-7.64) (-7.63) (-7.77) 
       
1983.year -0.525*** -0.553*** -0.534*** -0.524*** -0.523*** -0.533*** 
 (-9.25) (-9.72) (-9.41) (-9.24) (-9.23) (-9.38) 
       
1984.year -0.586*** -0.615*** -0.597*** -0.585*** -0.585*** -0.596*** 
 (-10.23) (-10.70) (-10.41) (-10.22) (-10.21) (-10.40) 
       
1985.year -0.637*** -0.670*** -0.650*** -0.637*** -0.636*** -0.650*** 
 (-11.02) (-11.52) (-11.22) (-11.01) (-11.00) (-11.22) 
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1986.year -0.661*** -0.697*** -0.674*** -0.661*** -0.660*** -0.674*** 
 (-11.29) (-11.83) (-11.49) (-11.29) (-11.28) (-11.49) 
       
1987.year -0.654*** -0.692*** -0.668*** -0.654*** -0.653*** -0.668*** 
 (-11.05) (-11.61) (-11.27) (-11.05) (-11.04) (-11.27) 
1988.year -0.578*** -0.615*** -0.593*** -0.578*** -0.578*** -0.594*** 
 (-9.68) (-10.23) (-9.90) (-9.67) (-9.67) (-9.91) 
1989.year -0.587*** -0.626*** -0.604*** -0.587*** -0.587*** -0.605*** 
 (-9.70) (-10.27) (-9.94) (-9.70) (-9.70) (-9.96) 
1990.year -0.585*** -0.623*** -0.600*** -0.584*** -0.585*** -0.601*** 
 (-9.54) (-10.10) (-9.76) (-9.53) (-9.54) (-9.78) 
1991.year -0.572*** -0.611*** -0.589*** -0.572*** -0.572*** -0.590*** 
 (-9.22) (-9.79) (-9.48) (-9.22) (-9.22) (-9.49) 
1992.year -0.553*** -0.596*** -0.571*** -0.553*** -0.553*** -0.572*** 
 (-8.85) (-9.46) (-9.12) (-8.85) (-8.85) (-9.12) 
1993.year -0.628*** -0.672*** -0.647*** -0.628*** -0.628*** -0.648*** 
 (-9.90) (-10.51) (-10.17) (-9.90) (-9.90) (-10.17) 
1994.year -0.573*** -0.617*** -0.592*** -0.572*** -0.572*** -0.593*** 
 (-8.95) (-9.56) (-9.22) (-8.94) (-8.94) (-9.23) 
1995.year -0.488*** -0.532*** -0.508*** -0.488*** -0.488*** -0.508*** 
 (-7.47) (-8.09) (-7.75) (-7.47) (-7.47) (-7.76) 
1996.year -0.474*** -0.520*** -0.493*** -0.474*** -0.474*** -0.493*** 
 (-7.18) (-7.82) (-7.45) (-7.18) (-7.19) (-7.46) 
1997.year -0.469*** -0.518*** -0.489*** -0.469*** -0.469*** -0.489*** 
 (-7.00) (-7.66) (-7.28) (-7.00) (-7.00) (-7.28) 
       
ll12  0.0000235***     
  (5.44)     
       
cull12  -0.0000466     
  (-0.68)     
       
ll_HH   0.0774***   0.0806*** 
   (3.74)   (3.83) 
       
cull_HH   -0.195   -0.250 
   (-1.10)   (-1.40) 
       
ll_HL    0.00162  0.0114 
    (0.13)  (0.91) 
       
cull_HL    -0.479*  -0.476* 
    (-2.14)  (-1.96) 
       
ll_LL     0.00699 0.00792 
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     (0.48) (0.53) 
       
cull_LL     0.215 0.0864 
     (1.29) (0.48) 
       
       
_cons -20.45*** -20.78*** -20.82*** -20.45*** -20.53*** -20.86*** 
 (-18.50) (-18.77) (-18.75) (-18.46) (-18.39) (-18.61) 
       
N 115020 115020 115020 115020 115020 115020 
              
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001    
 
 
